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Referat:
The thesis deals with ve di¤erent human capital-related problems and tries to ap-
proach these problems from an empirical point of view. Each essay includes an own
introduction and a short conclusion. All parts of the thesis are self-contained and can be
read separately.
The rst essay entitled "Size matters. The Relevance and Hicksian Surplus of Pre-
ferred College Class Size" deals with the impact of class size on student evaluations of
instructor performance using a sample of approximately 1,400 economics classes held at
the university of Munich. Secondly, the data of a representative survey is used to estimate
the willinngness-to-pay for preferred class size.
Based on these ndings and data, we try to give some evidence on what factors deter-
mine students preferences for small class size with special interest to gender di¤erences in
the second essay entitled "What determines Students Preferences for Small Class Size".
"Total Instructional Time Exposure and Student Achievement: An Extreme Bound
Analysis based on German state-level variation" mainly deals with instructional time
shortfall and student performance variation over the di¤erent German states using ex-
treme bound analysis. Thereby the techniques also overcomes an error-in-variables prob-
lem and implied misinterpretation of existing studies that disregard the fact of learning
being a cumulative process by relying on rather poor proxies for instructional time.
In the essay "No State Left Behind? Public education, accountability, and hybrid
forms of federal governance" the focus lies on announcement e¤ects of the respective
PISA results on election polls of federal government and federal states in Germany with
regard to di¤erences in relative performance in German states. In consideration of the
results, we draw a policy conclusion about the distribution of authorities in a public
education system between a federal government and federal states.
Finally the last essay entitled "A Re-examination of the Role of Gender in Deter-
mining Digital Piracy Behavior" concentrates on the gender-gap in determining digital
piracy behavior using a representative survey with more than 200 participants. In con-
trast to existing studies, we sharply discriminate between the frequency and the extent
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General introduction and outline of
the thesis
1
For decades, the international research on education economics has argued that
schooling is a major input to sustainable growth and employment, based both on theo-
retical and empirical arguments. Education is believed not only to increase the level of
output that can be attained in a given state of the technology (Solow 1957, Mankiw et
al. 1992), but also to foster technological innovation and adoption, thereby increasing
the potential for long-run growth (Romer 1990, Lucas 1992, Benhabib and Spiegel 1994).
This becomes a major issue in a knowledge-based economy, not only for growth per se,
but also for employment, as emphasised in the Lisbon strategy. At the country level, a
report by Angel de la Fuente (2003) underlined that the strong returns to human capital
investment made it a tool of choice for reducing economic imbalances between regions.
Commitee of the Regions (2005)
This statement of the Commitee of the Regions of the European Union clearly shows
the importance of human capital for national economies. Similar comments are made
by the OECD (Sveinbjörn B. et al. 2002), the UN (Department of Economic and So-
cial A¤airs 2010) and the US department of Commerce (U.S. department of Commerce,
International Trade Administration, 2008). Another important and closely to human
capital related factor that inuences economic growth is the establishment and enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights (Gould and Gruben 1996). Moreover, the strictness
of intellectual-property protection has a direct impact on the accumulation of human
capital (Bravo-Ortega and Lederman 2010).
In this context, a key question will be how to invest in and foster human capital? The
quality of primary, secondary and tertiary education plays a central role in increasing
the level of human capital in an economy (Sveinbjörn et al. 2002, Ang et al. 2011).
But what exactly is the inuence of, for example, class size? What is preferred college
class size and is there a monetary value for smaller classes? How strong is the impact
of instruction time on student performance? What is the e¤ect of international literacy
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studies like PISA (Programm for International Student Assessment) evaluation tests?
What are factors that favor intelectual property rights infringement and hence could
harm human capital? Factors that potentially inuence the quality of human capital are
in the focus of the present thesis.
We will deal with ve di¤erent human capital-related problems and try to approach
these problems from an empirical point of view. Each essay includes an own introduc-
tion and a short conclusion. All parts of the thesis are self-contained and can be read
separately.
The thesis is organized as follows:
Part 2 deals with the relevance and Hicksian surplus of preferred college class size.
First, the impact of class size on student evaluations of instructor performance using a
sample of approximately 1,400 economics classes held at the university of Munich is exam-
ined. Secondly, the data of a representative survey is used to estimate the willinngness-
to-pay for preferred class size.
Based on these ndings and data, we try to give some evidence on what factors deter-
mine students preferences for small class size with special interest to gender di¤erences
in Part 3.
Part 4 and 5 use data of the OECD PISA (Programme for International Student
Assessment) test. Part 4 mainly deals with instructional time shortfall and student
performance variation over the di¤erent German states using extreme bound analysis
(EBA). Thereby the techniques also overcomes an error-in-variables problem and implied
misinterpretation of existing studies that disregard the fact of learning being a cumulative
process by relying on rather poor proxies for instructional time.
In Part 5 the focus lies on announcement e¤ects of the respective PISA results
on election polls of federal government and federal states in Germany with regard to
di¤erences in relative performance in German states. In consideration of the results,
we draw a policy conclusion about the distribution of authorities in a public education
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system between a federal government and federal states.
Part 6 re-examines the role of gender in determining digital piracy behavior using a
representative survey with more than 200 participants. In contrast to existing studies,
we sharply discriminate between the frequency and the extent of pirating digital media.




Size Matters.The Relevance and Hicksian
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Together with Bernd Süssmuth
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1 Introduction
Although there has been made some recent progress (Bedard and Kuhn 2008, Kokke-
lenberg et al. 2008, Westerlund 2008), college courses still represent a relatively novel
laboratory from which to infer class size e¤ects. We subscribe to the view of Bedard and
Kuhn (2008) that summarizes the abundant wealth of literature on class size, referring
to the comprehensive reviews by Hanushek (2003) and Krueger (2003), in two central
insights: (i) results can depend considerably on econometric specication, and (ii) the
profession has not yet reached a consensus estimate of the impact of class size on student
performance. Bedard and Kuhn (2008) are the rst to show that insight (i) does, in
contrast to results for test-based outcomes at both primary/secondary and college level,
not apply to the result of a large negative impact of class size on instructor e¤ectiveness
as measured by college-level course evaluations. In the literature analyzing introductory
and intermediate college economics courses, there is rather mixed evidence for the re-
lationship between class size and student performance: Little or no evidence is found
by Saunders (1980) and Kennedy and Siegfried (1997) using scores on the U.S. TUCE
(Test of Understanding College Economics) exam, while Lopus and Maxwell (1995) and
Kennedy and Siegfried (1997) nd a positive relationship using scores on the TUCE III
exam. Finally, Arias and Walker (2004) and Kokkelenberg et al. (2008) relying on stu-
dent exam points and grades at public universities in the United States nd a negative
relationship. All these student test score-based studies are to some extent subject to
measurement error, instructors discretion over grades, attrition between courses, and
several other deciencies (Bedard and Kuhn 2008, p. 254).
A negative relationship between class size and instructional student evaluations is
found in the studies by Bedard and Kuhn (2008) and Westerlund (2008) for a U.S. and
a Scandinavian university, respectively. Both studies do not su¤er from the possibility
that results may confound the e¤ects of class size and instructor quality as is the case
for precursory work like McConell and Sosin (1984), DeCanio (1986), and Siegfried and
Walstad (1990).
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The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we analyze whether the ndings of the
large, highly signicant, and nonlinear negative impact of class size on student evaluations
of instructor e¤ectiveness reported in the seminal study by Bedard and Kuhn (2008)
can be replicated using data from a university outside the United States. Our sample
consisting of 1,438 economics classes (on 129 di¤erent topics) held by 299 instructors at
the University of Munich from Fall 1998 to Summer 2007 exceeds the one of Bedard and
Kuhn who studied 655 courses o¤ered by 64 instructors between Fall 1997 and Spring 2004
at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB). The econometric approach for the
most part of our Section 2 adheres to their methodology. We nd profound conrmatory
evidence for the UCSB ndings that we check  in contrast, e.g., to Westerlund (2008)
 also for robustness to the inclusion of course and instructor xed e¤ects. The latter
is particularly important considering problems of unobserved heterogeneity, for example,
the possibility that the best instructors might have been systematically assigned to larger
courses by department chairs.
Secondly, university-rating agencies, students, and tuition paying parents frequently
claim to place a high weight on small classes and an implied less anonymous and more
personal learning environment. However, as these preferred, i.e. most satisfying, class
sizes at the college level are neither guaranteed nor does there exist a direct market
(both holding, in particular, for public schools in continental Europe), class size has
the notion of an intangible. We make a rst attempt to quantify the implied welfare
surplus of this non-marketed intangible using a survey based on the contingent valuation
method (CVM) for a representative sample of all students enrolled in management science
(Betriebswirtschaftslehre) at the two universities in Munich. We nd that the monetary
value that students ascribe to the preservation of the status quo class size lies between
5 and 300 Euros per semester per student over the range of class sizes. As is common
practice in the CVM framework, we derive our estimates from stated willingness-to-pay
and willingess-to-accept responses in the counterfactual, though realistic, scenario of a
merger of the two departments. To the best of our knowledge, no study of college-level
class size has used such a CVM approach.
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2 Class size and instructor e¤ectiveness
2.1 Student evaluation data
The data for this study include nearly all economics classes o¤ered at the University
of Munich (Ludwig Maximilian University, henceforth: LMU) from Fall 1998 (Win-
tersemester 1998/1999 ) to Summer 2007 (Sommersemester 2007 ):1 During this period
of 18 semesters, 1,438 economics classes on 129 di¤erent topics were o¤ered by 299 in-
structors. Due to the fact that only in about three percent of considered classes, i.e. for
43 classes, class size exceeds 200 participants and in order to avoid placing too much
weight at the upper extremity of the distribution (Figure 1), we restrict our analysis
to classes with  200 students.2 Our data include information about class size, the
semester (Wintersemester, Sommersemester), the year that each course was o¤ered, the
level of the class (lower division, upper division), whether or not the course is a program
requirement, the instructor, and the average evaluation score. Summary statistics for
all variables are reported in Table 1. We follow Bedard and Kuhn (2008) by using a
variety of class size specications to explore the relationship between class size and stu-
dent evaluations of instructor e¤ectiveness. In particular, we will use linear, quadratic,
cubic, and  going beyond Bedard and Kuhn  also splined and fourth order polynomial
specications for class size, as well as categorical class size indicators to allow for the
exible estimation of any nonlinearity in the relationship between class size and student
evaluations of instructor e¤ectiveness.
The evaluation data are published and made available, corresponding to the natural
unit of observation (Bedard and Kuhn 2008, p. 255), in the form of student evaluation







1Disclosure of an instructors rating results is not mandatory. However, the resulting attrition
is less than 2%. A subsample of this data set is also used and described in Süssmuth (2006).
2Results for considering all class sizes can be found in the section "Additional Calculations"
at the end of the appendix
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where e denotes individual student evaluation scores, E is the average class evaluation
score, R is the number of evaluation responses, t denotes year (t =1998/1999,..., 2007), c
denotes course, and i denotes instructor. The number of responses (R) might di¤er from
class size or enrollment due to absenteeism on the day that evaluations are administered
(at LMU this usually is the case in the middle of the semester), withdrawals from the
course, or voluntary non-reponses. As there are no o¢cial enrollment statistics available,
we spot checked R with available statistics on the number of students taking the nal
exam for the respective class. We nd virtually no di¤erence in these gures. In contrast,
Cohn and Johnson (2006) nd end-of-term attendance to be not representative of average
class attendance in a 1997-2001 sample of principles of economics classes held at the
University of South Carolina. However, our study is di¤erent to most U.S. studies (Becker
and Powers 2001) as we neither rely on end-of-term nor on initial but rather on middle-
of-term gures. Given that half of the semester passed when evaluations take place, the
sunk cost of students to drop, in terms of foregone leisure or other opportunity costs, is
high and the incentive to do so correspondingly low. Actually, for some of the considered
classes there is a binding notication for the nal exam that precedes the evaluation
date. For these classes students who sign up for the nal exam and drop out between the
middle-of-term evaluation date and the nal exam would have to bear the consequences
of an unavoidable fail for the respective class. As this is, however, not the case for
the majority of courses in our sample, there might remain some attrition in the sense of
Hawthorne (Becker and Walstad 1990, Becker and Powers 2001). Similarly, problems of
data cleaning by administrators of the evaluation instrument and of unwillingness of
students to provide data and to correctly ll out forms remain. In this context, Becker
and Powers (2001) nd indications that the bias towards the irrelevance of class size
on teaching productivity measures increases the closer the measurement date is to the
end-of-class (posttest) point in time. Hence, although not a perfect proxy for average
attendance, middle-of-term gures can, at least, be seen as preferable to posttest data.
Similar to the U.S. practice (Hamermesh and Parker 2005, Bedard and Kuhn 2008),
the rating forms at LMU include: Overall, my personal impression is that the instructor
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was excellent (5); very good (4); satisfactory (3); unsatisfactory (2); very unsatisfactory
(1).3 At LMU, the sta¤ at the chair of the students dean (StudiendekanIn) is responsible
for the provision of rating forms and the coordination of students who administer the
evaluation instrument. After the evaluation (posttest), results are published online and in
the magazine of the economics students representative body. The run of the print version
of this magazine is approximately 2,500. Besides E, the published evaluation summary
contains information on the number of participants in the class, the title of the class, and
the instructor of record. This information is important because it allows us to estimate
instructor xed e¤ects models that control for time-invariant instructor heterogeneity and
instructor and course xed e¤ects models that control for both instructor and course-
specic heterogeneity. There are two central points that require further discussion. The
rst is the potential of evaluation data to represent more than a mere measure of students
satisfaction, that is, in particular, the potential to at least partially capture e¤ectiveness
in learning. The second point that needs to be addressed are remaining limitations of our
identication strategy. We will discuss both points in turn in the following paragraphs.
Although our sample is advantageous in several regards, we implicitly also want our
data to constitute to some degree a measure of student learning. Whether student eval-
uation data really has this potential is not completely uncontroversial. To highlight this
controversy and its complexity, consider a drill sergeant as a teacher. The students (pri-
vates) that hate or fear their instructor (sergeant) the most possibly generate the most
student learning (save more lives). Satisfaction and learning would not track each other.
However, a drill instructor-like teacher may put so much pressure on students that they
abandon their work in other classes and, though not perfectly, satisfaction and overall
learning may track each other again. Nevertheless, there is also other good theoretical
reason why students satisfaction and learning might fall apart. It is, for example, higher
learning and education that is the premier example of services that provide outputs that
3Just like UCSB scores, LMU scores actually run from (1) excellent to (5) very unsatisfactory,
but we follow Bedard and Kuhn (2008) by reversing them for interpretive ease. Similar to the
UCSB study we have only information on mean evaluation scores. Data on medians and intra-
class standard deviations is not available.
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depend, at least, partially on their customers as inputs4 (Rothschild and White 1995).
When students must pay a price in terms of foregone consumption time to learn more
for a particular class and/or instructor they may be less satised, although their learn-
ing improves. Again, satisfaction and learning would not track each other. However,
Rothschild and White (1995, p. 583-584) report several limitations of their model. In
particular, they nd that much of actual universities behavior is at odds with the pre-
dictions of their customers as inputs competitive equilibrium model. Thus, insights
from a variety of empirical studies might be more helpful to see the bigger picture of the
relationship between mere satisfaction and instructional productivity. One of the most
comprehensive studies on the evaluations-learning controversy and on the validity of stu-
dent ratings as a measure of teaching e¤ectiveness is Kulik (2001). His ndings based on
meta-study insights allow the conclusion that student satisfaction expressed in student
ratings is moderately (correlation coe¢cient of  :3) to highly (correlation coe¢cient of
 :5) correlated with student learning. Beyond this condence that we draw from meta-
analysis evidence, we also subscribe to the view of Westerlund (2008, p. 23) who argues
that in our context it is not so much the validity of student evaluations per se but rather
how evaluations are interpreted and used at the institutional level to make comparisons
among courses and teachers. One obvious indication that evaluations are indeed inter-
preted and used as measures of instructors e¤ectiveness in the economics department at
LMU and beyond is that they serve as the basis for best teaching awards and prizes. As
asserted on the respective webpages, all selection procedures for teaching awards at the
departmental and university-wide (VAC Alumni-Preis der Lehre), state-wide (Preis
für gute Lehre des Bayerischen StMWFK ), and national level (Ars Legendi Preis für
exzellente Hochschullehre) are based on the o¢cial evaluations that we use here. For
a comprehensive overview on the substantial role of awards as source of extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation see Frey and Neckermann (2009).
A nal caveat concerns remaining limitations of our identication strategy. As noted
4Among the many empirical studies that model universities as multi-input/multi-output
entities is also the recent one by Kempkes and Pohl (2010) analyzing the production e¢ciency
of German universities.
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above, it is virtually impossible to fully rule out endogeneity issues of class size. This
particularly concerns two situations. First, high-quality students might self-select into
certain classes, enhancing the educational experience of other students through peer
group e¤ects (see Rothschild and White 1995, p. 581). These students possibly value
low class sizes and seek out sections of courses that are smaller. Secondly, higher quality
instructors might also self-select if they are aware of the high-quality students self-
selection and get rst choice of time slots for classes. Given that smaller classes tend to be
concentrated in the early morning hours, these teachers might be biased in their time slots
preferences towards these early and smaller classes attended by more desirable students.
Some of these unobserved e¤ects might be captured by xed e¤ects. In particular, the
students selection is to some degree controlled for by course e¤ects  the instructors
time slots selection bias by instructor e¤ects. For both of these corrections to work, we
require this heterogeneity to be constant over time which is a reasonable, though not
necessarily met, assumption. In this context, it is noteworthy that students selection
clearly has its limits when it comes to required courses which constitute 65 percent of our
sample (Table 1). With regard to instructors selection through the choice of certain time
slots, there is also, at least, narrative evidence for a relatively high level of persistence
in scheduled times for the vast majority of classes in our sample which is seen by the
department as a service to facilitate students curriculum planning.
2.2 Descriptive analysis
In this subsection, we follow Bedard and Kuhn (2008) by considering it instructive to
examine the raw mean evaluation scores across the distribution of class sizes before
turning to the more formal analysis. To facilitate this exercise, Table 2 reports the mean
average evaluation score for classes size 1-19, 20-39, 40-59, 60-79, 80-99, 100-149, 150-200.
These cut-o¤s were chosen to ensure comparability with the UCSB ndings and to ensure
that all groups have reasonable sample size, respectively. The columns of Table 2 report
the mean average evaluation score, the class means di¤erence to the preceding class size
group, test statistics for the null hypothesis that a given mean is the same as the mean
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of the immediately preceding class size group, and the sample size. The reported results
show that there is a substantial reduction in mean evaluation scores as class size rises
from 1-19 to 20-39.5 At this point, scores continue to fall with class size but become
rather at until class size jumps over 79 students, where scores sizably increase for the
tiny lecture halls class size (80-99). Thereafter, scores signicantly drop and become
again relatively at (with an insignicant spike in class means for moving from small
lecture halls 100-149 to medium-sized lecture halls 150-200). The general shape and
nonlinear nature of the relationship between student evaluations and class size can also
be seen by simply plotting average student evaluation scores against class size, including
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Figure 1. Mean student evaluations across class size and median bands
2.3 Fixed e¤ects model estimates
While the results reported in Table 2 are, though not as much as for UCSB evaluations,
suggestive of lower student evaluations in large classes, they are not conclusive evidence
5This large threshold e¤ect at a class size of 20 students deserves more attention. In partci-
ular, it is straightforward to expect a change in instructional pedagogy from an average class
size of 10 (rst category) to an average class size of 30 (second category). The former is more
likely to rely much more on classroom discussion, active participation of students, and on open
response exams. We analyze this hypothesis at the end of the following section
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since the raw mean di¤erences do not control for observables or time-invariant unob-
servables. For example, they will be biased if instructors with di¤erent levels of teaching
ability are assigned to classes of di¤erent size. Since we know which instructors are teach-
ing which classes, we can purge our estimates of this type of bias using a xed e¤ects
model.
To estimate the impact of class size on average student evaluations, we consider the
following xed e¤ects model, including a class size polynomial




m + x0t + z
0
c + utci; (2)
where  is a vector of instructor xed e¤ects, S denotes class size, xt contains a time
trend and a dummy variable for summer semester (Table 1), zc contains time-invariant
course characteristics dened in Table 1, and u is the usual error term. All models
are weighted by the square root of the number of participants per class to address the
heteroscedasticity resulting from the aggregation of individual outcomes. If we replace
i by a scalar constant 0, our specication boils down to a pooled OLS model that we
use as a baseline specication. For this case, Figure 2 shows the adjusted R squared as
a function of m, where M = 8. It suggests that the goodness of t is barely sensitive to
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Class Size: Polynomial Degree
Adjusted R squared, pooled OLS
Figure 2. Adjusted R squared and polynomial degree of class size
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Additionally, we consider alternative functional forms for class size, i.e., a logarithmic
form (1 lnStci), linear and cubic splines,
6 as well as dummies for class size categories C
(Table 2) as in Bedard and Kuhn (2008):







c + utci: (3)
An attractive feature of the above panel specications (2) and (3) is that the instructor
xed e¤ects allow us to purge the class size estimate of potential bias induced by time-
invariant instructor heterogeneity. In this context, Bedard and Kuhn (p. 257) note
that although Siegfried and Kennedy (1995) nd no evidence that department chairs
assign better instructors to large introductory economics classes (which are generally
the largest courses o¤ered), our models ability to include instructor xed e¤ects across
all economics classes can help to prevent that non-random assignment across economics
classes at large, based on instructor quality, is biasing the estimated impact of class size
on student evaluations.
As Kelly Bedard and Peter Kuhn note, models (2) and (3) have three major advan-
tages over most of the previously estimated models in the literature. First, the panel
nature allows for the inclusion of instructor xed e¤ects. This is important because in-
structors di¤er across important margins such as teaching ability and grading schemes.
Secondly, the pooling across courses and years ensures a su¢cient sample size to allow for
the use of a variety of exible class size functional forms. This is important because there
is no reason to believe that the relationship between student evaluations and class size
are linear (Figure 1), or even quadratic. In fact, as we will see, the relationship between
student evaluations and class size is initially quite steeply negative, subsequently becomes
rather at, and for class sizes beyond 150 students may even rise slightly. Third, we can
also include course xed e¤ects to equations (2) and (3) to control for course heterogene-
ity on such margins as di¢culty, numeracy, and average student interest in particular
subject matters.
6Results for the logarithmic form, other than cubic splines and higher polynomials can be
found the section "Additional Calculations" at the end of the appendix. Qualitatively, these
specications do not alter our ndings.
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The core set of results for the impact of class size on average student evaluations
of instructor e¤ectiveness are reported in Table 3. The rst pair of columns report the
pooled cross-section results. Column (i) species class size as a cubic function and column
(ii) species it as a exible set of indicator variables. Focusing on the results reported in
column (ii), as class size initially rises average student evaluations fall, but there are two
upward spikes at class sizes of 70-90 and 150-200.
It is easier to describe the relationship between class size and class evaluations graph-
ically. For comparative purposes, Figure 3 begins by plotting the predicted mean evalu-
ations by class size based on the standard cross-sectional model with third order (cubic)
polynomial class size specications (all class size coe¢cients used in Figures 3 to 5 are

















Figure 3. Cross section predictions
Columns (iii) and (iv) in Table 3 replicate columns (i) and (ii) with the addition
of instructor xed e¤ects. Two features of the instructor xed e¤ects (I-FE) estimates
warrant comment. First, the sample is smaller because instructors only observed once
or only in one class size category during the sample period are excluded from the I-FE
sample.7 Second, once time-invariant instructor heterogeneity has been accounted for it
7For the sake of comparability of size-e¤ect measures (staircase discrete and cubic continu-
ous), we relied on the same dataset that excludes observations for instructors who are found
only in one class size category during our sample period for both measures.
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is clear that omitted variables bias attens out the cross-sectional point estimates for
the relationship between student evaluations of instructor e¤ectiveness across class size.
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Figure 5. I-C-FE predictions
As a nal check for time invariant omitted variables bias we add course xed e¤ects
to the model that already includes instructor xed e¤ects (I-C-FE) as described in (2)
and (3). It is important to note that sample size again reduces because instructors who
taught only one course are excluded as well as courses taught by a single instructor during
the entire sample period. These exclusions reduce the sample size to 1,176 observations.
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The I-C-FE results using a cubic function of class size and a exible set of class size
indicators are reported in columns (v) and (vi) in Table 3.
Overall, it appears that the simple pooled cross-section estimates are biased by the
omission of time-invariant instructor and course controls. Furthermore, an accurate es-
timate of the impact of class size on student evaluations of instructor e¤ectiveness does
require a exible functional form for class size, regardless of the inclusion or exclusion
of instructor and/or course xed e¤ects. Estimates of the impact of class size on test-
based outcomes, at all levels of education from primary school through college, seem to
depend to a large extent on the econometric specication. In contrast, our estimates of
the impact of class size on student evaluations of instructor e¤ectiveness are remarkably
consistent across instructor xed e¤ect and instructor-plus-course xed e¤ect specica-
tions. In all cases we consistently nd a large negative impact of class size on student
evaluations of instructor e¤ectiveness using a representative sample that encompasses
economics courses at all college levels.
As a nal remark on the relationship between class size and students evaluations,
let us consider the discrete form and the distribution of mean evaluation scores (Table
2) again. As noted earlier, there seems to be a threshold e¤ect at around 20 students.
Given the relatively large sample size (i.e., 384 and 432) in the rst two considered
relatively small size categories (i.e., 1-19 and 20-39), it is useful to consider di¤erent lines
of demarcation (Table 4), in order to nd out which one of those lines is providing the
highest level of explanatory power for evaluations. Whether the corresponding class size is
a value between, say 18 and 24, is of particular relevance if, for example, departments are
to set limits on seminars and might provide information for aiding policy in practice.
As can be seen from Table 4, both the negative e¤ect on the following second class size
category and the corresponding adjusted R-squared are clearly the largest for a reference
category of 1-19 students. In accordance with intuition on applicable pedagogy, there is
a threshold e¤ect at a maximum class size of 19. For class formats  20 students, an
instructor hardly knows her students by name and the course loses its hands-on character.
The drop in evaluation scores for this line of demarcation is the most profound.
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3 The contingent value of preferred class size
3.1 Data and empirical approach
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is a survey-based technique to assess posi-
tive externalities of more or less intangible goods that are not directly internalized by
the market by quantifying the corresponding willingness-to-pay (WTP)8 of concerned
individuals (Arrow et al. 1993). The adequate CVM set-up allows one to quantify the
uncompensated Hicksian surplus, the compensated Hicksian surplus, and the Marshallian
surplus, where the latter can be approximated by
MS  ES +
1
2



















and CS, ES, and MS denote compensated, equivalent, and Marshallian surplus, re-
spectively. H (U0) and H (U1) represent compensated and equivalent Hicksian demand,
respectively. The Marshallian demand is given by the line running through ba in the
right-hand side diagram of Figure 6. The derivation of the welfare measures shown in
Figure 6 is standard, apart from the underlying scenario starting from a reduction of
quality (i.e., an increase of class size) rather than from the usual increase in price. Val-
ues on the abscissa are contingent, inasmuch they have to be interpreted relative to the
status quo. In this sense, they represent a demand for the status quo which we presume
to reect a preferred class size as students would not have enrolled given inacceptable
conditions.
In 2007, we conducted an online survey, for which we recruited participants online and
o­ine. On-campus o­ine-interviews and pre-tests supplemented the survey. In order to
avoid issues of selectivity we tried to get our number of respondents as close as possible
to the total population (Table 5). Furthermore, no information on the surveys content
8Note, in our study one half of repondents were asked for a rebate amount of tuition fees,
in order to sustain their initial utility level. The situation was posited as hypothetical, that
is, fees were not actually returned. This stated willingness-to-accept measure quanties an
upper bound value of the contingent value. As can be seen from Figure 6.
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was given prior to the interviews and online query. The withdrawal rate after start was <
3%. After some stratication along the two central dimensions gender and lower/upper
division, the sample consists of 560 (553) individuals (Table 5). It is a representative
sample of all students enrolled in management studies, i.e., in Betriebswirtschaftslehre
leading to the degree of a Diplom Kaufmann awarded by either of the two universities
in Munich, i.e., either of LMU or of Munich University of Technology (Technische Uni-
versität München, henceforth TUM). This degree is equivalent to an M.Sc./M.A. degree
in business administration (management) in German speaking countries. Note, in our
study one half of respondents were asked for a hypothetical rebate of tuition fees that
were introduced in Munich in 2007 in order to sustain their initial utility level. This

































Figure 6. CS, ES, and MS derived from WTP and WTA
There are several papers that document what has become known as warm glow-
e¤ect in the context of CVM (see, e.g., Andreoni 1989, Kahnemann and Knetsch 1992,
Nunes and Schokkaert 2003). Accordingly, survey participants potentially gain some sort
of moral satisfaction through the mere act of giving or claiming to be willing to give per se.
This e¤ect relates to concepts such as peer-group pressure, feelings of guilt, and sympathy.
It superimposes a cold WTP, in particular, in face-to-face interviews. The fact that
the bias induced by a warm glow is pronounced for personal interviews is documented
by Schkade and Payne (1994) who analyze verbal protocols of CVM-based studies. These
authors nd that some respondents vocalize a parallel with charitable contributions when
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answering the WTP survey in front of an interviewer. We can interpret this nding as
lending support to the hypothesis that the warm glow is a relevant bias in personal
rather than in online interviews as in the one of the present study.
In our query students were rst asked some introductory questions on their nancial
situation, the educational background of their parents (both of these rst two questions
were intended to capture the budgetary situation of respondents), the progress of their
studies, and the personal weight they put on the quality of higher education in comparison
to their student class mates (Table 6). Then we asked them for the average number of
student class mates they are currently attending classes with. We used an interval-scale
relying on the same class size groups as in Section 2. It was followed for about one
half of the respondents (NWTP = 278) by the following counterfactual scenario: As has
been recently discussed in the media, the two Munich departments o¤ering programs in
management and business administration (Betriebswirtschaftslehre), that is, LMU and
TUM, will be merged into one department. Overall, the aim of the merger is to realize
synergies. The merger implies that, on average, more students than before attend the
average class o¤ered. For you this would bear the implication that you end up in the next
higher class size group [pop-up with ticked average class size group and next higher group
is shown]. Please abstract from any other imaginable consequences of the merger  like
changes of sta¤ or changes in the corporate identity of the department  and focus on the
increase in class size. Would you personally be willing to contribute some of your own
money every semester to ensure that class size remains the same as before the merger
of departments? The other approximate half of students (NWTA = 275) was confronted
with the same scenario, however, with a di¤erent ending question: [...] How much of
your paid semestral tuition does the university need to transfer back to you in order to
make you indi¤erent to the class-size situation before the merger?
In a series of pre-tests, the questionnaire and, in particular, also the above scenario
were carefully tested. The pre-tests provided relevant information with regard to par-
ticipants understanding, potential caveats of the scenario, and ranges of possible WTP
and WTA values and ranges. The latter is of particular importance as our survey did
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not rely on an unfavorable dichotomous choice framework or open-ended valuation ques-
tion but on a closed-ended one, that is, on a valuation question in payment card format
(Whitehead 2006). A payment card strategy is based on pre-tests in which respondents
are o¤ered cards with monetary amounts on it to ascribe them to the preservation of
certain status quo class size intervals. From those pre-tests the actual surveys minimum
ranges of interval-levels is derived. In order for respondents to see noticeable di¤erences
in intervals they can tick in the survey, intervals are usually constructed so as to pro-
portionally increase to their starting value. In our case, the ultimate of eight possible
answers (0 Euros and the seven ranges 1-10, 11-20, 21-40, 41-80, 81-150, 151-300, 301-
500 Euros) is truncated at 500 Euros. Nevertheless, respondents were also given the
possibility to express another (possibly higher) amount. As is standard in CVM-studies,
we used reminders of budget constraints to minimize hypothetical bias of respondents.9
We classify stated WTP and WTA values in eight groups using the respective range
means. In accordance with our pre-test runs, boundary values are set to 0 and 300
Euros, respectively.
3.2 Findings
As can be seen from Table 6, averaging WTP and WTA samples (rst column), students
are willing to pay for the avoidance (or need to be paid for the acceptance) of a marginal
deterioration of class size by one additional student 4.87 Euros per semester. For a
substantial increase, i.e., for the doubling of the existing class size, the corresponding
amount is 324.74 Euros. For the rst case (marginal deterioration) this in combination
with the total number of students from our underlying population (Table 5) implies an
equivalent Hicksian surplus of 5,411.58 (= 3:03  1; 786) Euros, a compensated Hicksian
surplus of 12,073.36 Euros, and a Marshallian surplus of 8,742.47 Euros per semester.
The latter is a straightforward approximation of QBbaQS in Figure 6. In the second case
9Specically, the survey reminded students of keepping in mind their other expenditures,
in particular, for food and rental fees. Additionally, a pop-up information provided by the
respective student in the introductory questions on his/her nancial situation was displayed.
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(substantial deterioration), our results imply an equivalent Hicksian surplus of 329,820.62
(= 184:67  1; 786) Euros, a compensated Hicksian surplus of 832,865.38 Euros, and a
Marshallian surplus of 581,343 Euros per semester. Our detailed results reported in
Tables 7 and 8 are graphically summarized in Figure 7 and Figure 8. In these gures the
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Figure 8. Calculated amounts for increasing class size by 10 students
Of course, we should keep in mind the caveat that our surplus estimates are generated
on the base of asking students to estimate their average class size, which certainly comes
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at the cost of an implied measurement error. Thus, it would be comforting to nd some
similarity of our CVM-based surplus measures with the presumably more robust FE-
models predictions in Section 2.3, controlling, at least, for some unobserved heterogeneity.
Obviously, the substantial deterioration scenario (Figure 7) reinforces our ndings from
the instructional evaluations analysis, inasmuch as our WTP/WTA measures increase up
to class sizes of 125 students, that is, approximately corresponding to the lower turning
point of the discrete and, in the I-FE case, also of the polynomial function describing the
relationship of evaluations and class size in Figure 4 and Figure 5. For both scenarios
(Figure 7 and Figure 8), there are also minor dips followed by a local peak in the class size
band 90-125 students which have their analogues in minor local maxima of the staircase
function shape of student evaluations of instructor e¢ciency for roughly the same class
size range (Figure 4 and Figure 5), i.e. 80-99 students.10
Also similar to ndings for our instructor e¢ciency measures, WTP/WTA-measures
of preferred class size are both for marginal and substantial deterioration scenarios quite
elastic in classes with less than approximately 125 students, while beyond this threshold
the valuation of the status quo becomes rather insensitive to increases in class size. This
can be seen from the rather steep shape of functions in Figure 7 and Figure 8 up to
ordinate values of 125 and a rather at shape beyond this point.
10Note, results are robust for considering median values of WTP and WTA instead of means.
See appendix for further calculations and gures.
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4 Conclusion
This paper provided profound conrmatory evidence for the recent nding of a large,
highly signicant, and nonlinear negative impact of class size on student evaluations of
instructor e¤ectiveness that is robust to the inclusion of course and instructor xed e¤ects.
Going beyond this conrmation of the ndings for economics courses o¤ered by UCSB
that are analyzed in the seminal study by Bedard and Kuhn (2008), we run a survey based
on the contingent valuation method and a representative sample of all Munich students of
management and business administration (Diplom-Studiengang Betriebswirtschaftslehre)
to quantify the welfare surplus of preferred class size. We nd the average monetary
value of the surplus to lie between 5 and 300 Euros per semester and student. Overall,
Hicksian and Marshallian surpluses can reach substantial values of 0.5 to 0.8 million
Euros per semester. From an administrators perspective, our ndings imply that both
instructor e¢ciency as measured by instructional evaluations and welfare measures are
(highly) elastic in classes with less than approximately 100-125 students, while beyond
this threshold the valuation of the status quo becomes insensitive to increases in class size.
In practice, it is usually this dimension were the instructors use of a microphone becomes
inevitable. Similarly, we nd a threshold e¤ect at a maximum class size of 19 which can
be valuable information for aiding policy in practice if, for example, departments have
to set participation limits on seminars. This result conrms our intuition with regard to
applicable pedagogy as for class formats  20 students an instructor hardly knows her
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All around the world, university-rating agencies, administrators, students, and tuition
paying parents claim to place a high weight on small classes and an implied less anony-
mous and more personal learning environment. However, as these preferred, i.e. most
satisfying, class sizes at the college level are neither guaranteed nor does there exist a
direct market both holding, in particular, for public schools in continental Europe class
size has the notion of an intangible. In Mandel and Süssmuth (2011)a, we make a rst
attempt to quantify the implied welfare surplus of this non-marketed intangible using a
survey based on the contingent valuation method (CVM) for a representative sample of
all students enrolled in management science (Betriebswirtschaftslehre) at the two univer-
sities in Munich. To obtain our welfare measures, we made use of the fact that Munich
local media frequently discuss the merger of business schools located at the two univer-
sities (Munich University of Technology and University of Munich). The monetary value
derived from stated willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingess-to-accept (WTA) responses
in the counterfactual scenario of a merger that students ascribe to the preservation of
the status quo class size lies between 5 and 300 Euros per semester per student over the
range of class sizes. From an administrators perspective, our ndings imply that welfare
measures are highly elastic in classes with less than approximately 100 students, while
beyond this threshold the valuation of the status quo becomes insensitive to increases in
class size. But what determines these ndings? What role is played by students study
progress, nancial situation, educational background of parents, and gender?
The present paper, building on Mandel and Süssmuth (2011)a, seeks to answer these
questions by analyzing the determinants of students preferences for small class sizes. We
nd male students to systematically show a higher preference in terms of their WTP and
WTA for small class sizes. This nding is reinforced by the observed gender composition
of enrollement rates at high tuition private business schools in Germany. Given that
small college class sizes foster teaching e¢ciency (Arias and Walker 2004, Kokkelenberg
et al. 2008, Bedard and Kuhn 2008, Westerlund 2008, Mandel and Süssmuth 2011a)
and given that future experience-income and age-income proles of male students run
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markedly above the ones of female students in the economics and social sciences eld, this
result can be rationalized by standard human capital theory arguments. Additionally, we
nd that besides a general preference for higher education cost awareness of students,
captured by their need to work or externally nance their studies, has a signicant
positive impact on their preference for small class size.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our strategy
to obtain measures of welfare that is drawn from small class sizes by Munich business
administration students. Section 3 reports our estimates of determinants of valuing
preferred class sizes and discusses the plausibility of ndings. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
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2 The contingent value of preferred class size
2.1 Data and empirical approach
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is a survey-based technique to assess posi-
tive externalities of more or less intangible goods that are not directly internalized by
the market by quantifying the corresponding willingness-to-pay (WTP)1 of concerned
individuals (Arrow et al. 1993). The adequate CVM set-up allows one to quantify the
uncompensated Hicksian surplus, the compensated Hicksian surplus, and the Marshallian
surplus, where the latter can be approximated by
MS  ES +
1
2



















and CS, ES, and MS denote compensated, equivalent, and Marshallian surplus, re-
spectively. H (U0) and H (U1) represent compensated and equivalent Hicksian demand,
respectively. The Marshallian demand is given by the line running through ba in the
right-hand side diagram of Figure 1. The derivation of the welfare measures shown in
Figure 1 is standard, apart from the underlying scenario starting from a reduction of
quality (i.e., an increase of class size) rather than from the usual increase in price. Val-
ues on the abscissa are contingent, inasmuch they have to be interpreted relative to the
status quo. In this sense, they represent a demand for the status quo which we presume
to reect a preferred class size as students would not have enrolled given inacceptable
conditions.
In 2007, we conducted an online survey, for which we recruited participants online and
o­ine. On-campus o­ine-interviews and pre-tests supplemented the survey. In order to
avoid issues of selectivity we tried to get our number of respondents as close as possible
to the total population (Table 1). Furthermore, no information on the surveys content
1Note, in our study one half of repondents were asked for a rebate amount of tuition fees,
in order to sustain their initial utility level. The situation was posited as hypothetical, that
is, fees were not actually returned. This stated willingness-to-accept measure quanties an
upper bound value of the contingent value. As can be seen from Figure 1.
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was given prior to the interviews and online query. The withdrawal rate after start was <
3%. After some stratication along the two central dimensions gender and lower/upper

































Figure 1. CS, ES, and MS derived from WTP and WTA
It is a representative sample of all students enrolled in management studies, i.e.,
in Betriebswirtschaftslehre leading to the degree of a Diplom Kaufmann awarded
by either of the two universities in Munich, i.e., either of LMU or of Munich Univer-
sity of Technology (Technische Universität München, henceforth TUM). This degree is
equivalent to an M.Sc./M.A. degree in business administration (management) in Ger-
man speaking countries. Note, in our study one half of respondents were asked for a
hypothetical rebate of tuition fees that were introduced in Munich in 2007 in order to
sustain their initial utility level. This WTA measure quanties an upper bound value of
the contingent value (Figure 1).
There are several papers that document what has become known as warm glow-
e¤ect in the context of CVM (see, e.g., Andreoni 1989, Kahnemann and Knetsch 1992,
Nunes and Schokkaert 2003). Accordingly, survey participants potentially gain some sort
of moral satisfaction through the mere act of giving or claiming to be willing to give per se.
This e¤ect relates to concepts such as peer-group pressure, feelings of guilt, and sympathy.
It superimposes a cold WTP, in particular, in face-to-face interviews. The fact that
the bias induced by a warm glow is pronounced for personal interviews is documented
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by Schkade and Payne (1994) who analyze verbal protocols of CVM-based studies. These
authors nd that some respondents vocalize a parallel with charitable contributions when
answering the WTP survey in front of an interviewer. We can interpret this nding as
lending support to the hypothesis that the warm glow is a relevant bias in personal
rather than in online interviews as in the one of the present study.
In our query students were rst asked some introductory questions on their nancial
situation, the educational background of their parents (both of these rst two questions
were intended to capture the budgetary situation of respondents), the progress of their
studies, and the personal weight they put on the quality of higher education in comparison
to their student class mates (Table 2). Then we asked them for the average number of
student class mates they are currently attending classes with. We used an interval-scale
relying on the same class size groups as in Section 2. It was followed for about one
half of the respondents (NWTP = 278) by the following counterfactual scenario: As has
been recently discussed in the media, the two Munich departments o¤ering programs in
management and business administration (Betriebswirtschaftslehre), that is, LMU and
TUM, will be merged into one department. Overall, the aim of the merger is to realize
synergies. The merger implies that, on average, more students than before attend the
average class o¤ered. For you this would bear the implication that you end up in the next
higher class size group [pop-up with ticked average class size group and next higher group
is shown]. Please abstract from any other imaginable consequences of the merger  like
changes of sta¤ or changes in the corporate identity of the department  and focus on the
increase in class size. Would you personally be willing to contribute some of your own
money every semester to ensure that class size remains the same as before the merger
of departments? The other approximate half of students (NWTA = 275) was confronted
with the same scenario, however, with a di¤erent ending question: [...] How much of
your paid semestral tuition does the university need to transfer back to you in order to
make you indi¤erent to the class-size situation before the merger?
In a series of pre-tests, the questionnaire and, in particular, also the above scenario
were carefully tested. The pre-tests provided relevant information with regard to par-
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ticipants understanding, potential caveats of the scenario, and ranges of possible WTP
and WTA values and ranges. The latter is of particular importance as our survey did
not rely on an unfavorable dichotomous choice framework or open-ended valuation ques-
tion but on a closed-ended one, that is, on a valuation question in payment card format
(Whitehead 2006). A payment card strategy is based on pre-tests in which respondents
are o¤ered cards with monetary amounts on it to ascribe them to the preservation of
certain status quo class size intervals. From those pre-tests the actual surveys minimum
ranges of interval-levels is derived. In order for respondents to see noticeable di¤erences
in intervals they can tick in the survey, intervals are usually constructed so as to pro-
portionally increase to their starting value. In our case, the ultimate of eight possible
answers (0 Euros and the seven ranges 1-10, 11-20, 21-40, 41-80, 81-150, 151-300, 301-
500 Euros) is truncated at 500 Euros. Nevertheless, respondents were also given the
possibility to express another (possibly higher) amount. As is standard in CVM-studies,
we used reminders of budget constraints to minimize hypothetical bias of respondents.2
We classify stated WTP and WTA values in eight groups using the respective range
means. In accordance with our pre-test runs, boundary values are set to 0 and 300
Euros, respectively.
2.2 Welfare measures
As can be seen from Table 2, averaging WTP and WTA samples (rst column), students
are willing to pay for the avoidance (or need to be paid for the acceptance) of a marginal
deterioration of class size by one additional student 4.87 Euros per semester. For a
substantial increase, i.e., for the doubling of the existing class size, the corresponding
amount is 324.74 Euros.
For the rst case (marginal deterioration) this in combination with the total number of
students from our underlying population (Table 1) implies an equivalent Hicksian surplus
2Specically, the survey reminded students of keepping in mind their other expenditures,
in particular, for food and rental fees. Additionally, a pop-up information provided by the
respective student in the introductory questions on his/her nancial situation was displayed.
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of 5,411.58 (= 3:03  1; 786) Euros, a compensated Hicksian surplus of 12,073.36 Euros,
and a Marshallian surplus of 8,742.47 Euros per semester. The latter is a straightforward
approximation of QBbaQS in Figure 1. In the second case (substantial deterioration), our
results imply an equivalent Hicksian surplus of 329,820.62 (= 184:67  1; 786) Euros, a
compensated Hicksian surplus of 832,865.38 Euros, and a Marshallian surplus of 581,343
Euros per semester. Our detailed results reported in Tables 3 and 4 are graphically
summarized in Figure 2 and Figure 3. In these gures the amount in Euros is depicted
on the ordinate, the class size on the abscissa.
WTP/WTA measures increase up to class sizes of approxiamtely 100 students. For
both scenarios (Figure 2 and Figure 3), there are also minor dips followed by a local
peak in the class size band 90-125 students.3 WTP/WTA-measures of preferred class
size are both for marginal and substantial deterioration scenarios quite elastic in classes
with less than approximately 125 students, while beyond this threshold the valuation of
the status quo becomes rather insensitive to increases in class size. This can be seen from
the rather steep shape of functions in Figure 2 and Figure 3 up to ordinate values of 125
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10 30 50 70 90 125 175 250 350
Upper Bound: WTA Medians, Lower Bound: WTP Medians
Marshall Medians
Figure 2. Calculated amounts for doubling class size
Note: Left panel based on means, right panel based on medians; bands: [WTA; WTP]
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10 30 50 70 90 125 175 250 350
Upper Bound: WTA Medians, Lower Bound: WTP Medians
Marshall Medians
Figure 3. Calculated amounts for increasing class size by 10 students
Note: Left panel based on means, right panel based on medians; bands: [WTA; WTP]
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3 Determinants of valuing small class size
In order to nd what determines students preferences for small class sizes, we condition
the contingent values for di¤erent scenarios as sketched in the preceding section on several
measures and indicators based on questions that we asked respondents in our survey
before asking them for their WTP/WTA in the merger-of-departments counterfactual.
The available information includes educational background of parents (binary: 1 if, at
least, B.Sc./B.A. degree), cost awareness of students as captured by their need to work or
externally nance their studies (binary: 1 if work and/or credit nanced), study progress
(binary: 1 if lower division), self-assessment of the relative weight put on higher education
as compared to a students classmates (binary: 1 if above average), sex (1 if male), and
average class size of currently attended courses.
Regression results from corresponding OLS specications.are reported in Table 5.
The rst obvious point to note with regard to our estimates is that the educational
background of parents seems not to be associated in any statistical signicant way with
students preferences for small class sizes. Less surprisingly, we nd that a students self-
assessed relative weight on higher education compared to her classmates is sizably and
signicantly associated with a higher WTP/WTA for small class sizes. A coe¢cient of
approximately the same size is estimated for the study progress variable. According to
this estimate, it is particular the group of lower division students that show a substantial
WTP/WTA for small class sizes. However, as can be seen from the last column of Table
5, the e¤ect is estimated as not statsitically di¤erent from zero in the case of just minor
deteriorations in class size, that is, an increase of adding another ten students to the class.
The same applies to the estimated coe¢cient for cost awareness of students. Students
that have to work and or to take out a loan in order to cover their tuition fees and/or
living expenses show, in general, a stronger preference for small class size in terms of
their stated WTA or WTP. This does, however, not apply in the minor deterioration
scenario.
A nal signicant association, lying in terms of magnitude between the relative weight
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on higher education and the cost awareness coe¢cient, is found for students being of
male gender. It is estimated throughout statistically signicant at a 5% level. This is
a remarkable result. It implies that given that small college class sizes foster teaching
e¢ciency as found in recent studies (Arias and Walker 2004, Kokkelenberg et al. 2008,
Bedard and Kuhn 2008, Westerlund 2008, Mandel and Süssmuth 2011a), male students
would only be willing to invest more in quality of education (show a higher WTA/WTP),
if their present value of revenues from this education will be higher (see, for example,
the classical model by Ben-Porath 1967). The latter requires experience-earning proles
of male students to lie markedly above the ones of female students in the economics and
social sciences eld. In Germany, this is indeed the case as can be seen from the graphs
shown in Figure 4 that are based on Mincer-type regressions (Weldi 2009). Interestingly
and in line with our ndings, the average share of male students in the four most popular
private universities in Germany, which in the majority represent business schools, lies at
64 percent (Table 6).
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Figure 4. Experience-income proles by eld of study (graduates, full-time working)
Data: Statistisches Bundesamt Microzensus 2004, German Labor Force Survey
Note: Upper (lower) panel: male (female) individuals
Ordinate: Monthly net income (in Euro); Source: Weldi (2009)
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the determinants of students stated preferences for small
class sizes. It is found that male students systematically show a higher preference in
terms of their WTP and WTA for small class sizes. This nding is reinforced by the
observed gender composition of enrollement rates at high tuition private universities in
Germany. Given the recent ndings of small college class sizes fostering teaching e¢ciency
and against the background of notouriously steeper experience-income proles of male
university graduates in Germany, this result can be rationalized by standard human
capital theory arguments. Additionally, we nd that besides a general preference for
higher education cost awareness of students, captured by their need to work or externally
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Total Instructional Time Exposure and
Student Achievement:
An Extreme Bounds Analysis based on German state-level
variation
Together with Bernd Süssmuth
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1 Introduction
This paper is in the tradition of the seminal study by Card and Krueger (1992) in
that it relies on cross-state variation in education inputs and institutions. There is a
continuing debate on whether schooling resources have a bearing on student outcomes
(Krueger 2003; Hanushek 2003, 2004, 2006a). Todd and Wolpin (2003) see econometric
misspecication and failure to account for major determinants of student achievement
as the central problem in correctly identifying the relationship. Recently, a little studied
input receives growing attention: In Coates (2003), Eren and Millimet (2007), Marcotte
(2007), Marcotte and Hemelt (2008), and Lavy (2010) the focus is on instructional time
by subject.
Our study is unique in using data of instructional time cumulated from all academic
years leading up to the test date in each of the two subjects math and reading. We rely on
cross-state variation in Germany, where 16 states share the same cultural and legal system
but pursue di¤erent education policies (Schulte 2004). The fact that German states have
responsibility for both primary and secondary education, makes our data particularly
suited to analyze the impact cumulative instruction has on student achievements. As
for the educational instructionperformance relationship, Marcotte (2007) and Marcotte
and Hemelt (2008) are the only studies that focus on and consider the cumulative nature
of instruction as determinant of student performance. They make use of intra-state
school level and snowfall (unscheduled closings) data for students in grades 3, 5 and
8 in Maryland. Their approximation of a cumulated e¤ect is based on the hypothesis
that the lower the grade, the less room exists for making up and the higher the relative
weight of lost instruction. Therefore, the instructional time shortfall e¤ect decreases
with grade. However, this cumulated e¤ect is of second order as only measures of total
snowfall in the academic year of the test date (Marcotte 2007) or in the preceding 3 years
(Marcotte and Hemelt 2008) are considered. Coates (2003) relying on district-level data
for Illinois and considering uncumulated daily instruction in third grade classes, nds
that a 10 percent increase in mathematics instruction per week raises the average math
score by about 0.4 percent. Similar small e¤ects are found for English instruction. Eren
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and Millimet (2007) analyze the joint e¤ect the daily number of class periods and the
average class length (in minutes) has on cognitive test results of US public schools 10th
graders (National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988). Only uncumulated 10th grade
instructional conditions are considered. Their reform-type nding is that changing the
system from one with  6 daily classes lasting  51 minutes to another one with seven
45-minutes classes increases test scores by 2 percent.
In sociology of education, sociolinguistics, and the neurosciences, a recent body of lit-
erature is concerned with the structured processing of knowledge ascribing it to di¤erent
modes of learning. An essential element of these modes is to conceptualize knowledge-
building through cumulative learning. Accordingly, learning is found to be a cumulative
process during which new knowledge is dependent and based on a precedingly acquired
stock of knowledge; see, among others, Freebody et al. (2008), Maton (2009), and Yew
et al. (2011). Yet, to the present, empirical work in the economics of education literature
does not take these ndings into account and relies on rather poor measures of instruc-
tional time as independent variables. This is not to say that the relevance of current
and past inputs and the deciencies of approaches abstracting from input histories is
not recognized in the literature (Card and Krueger 1996, Todd and Wolpin 2003). It is
simply and mostly due to data limitations not done. Typically, estimates are based on
instructional time proxies such as students self-reported hours of instruction per week as
they relate to the respective test year. Todd and Wolpin (2003) refer to these measures
as contemporaneous inputs. Given insights from sociology and neuro-sciences or, in
general, from multidisciplinary empirical literature studies (Todd and Wolpin 2003, p.
F3), however, a cumulative measure such as cumulated instructional time (henceforth,
CIT) from rst grade to test year for each observed cohort is required. This becomes all
the more obvious if we look at an arbitrarily chosen mathematics sample task from PISA
(OECD 2009, p. 125) that reads as follows:
Mathematics Unit 27: A result of global warming is that the ice of some glaciers is
melting. Twelve years after the ice disappears, tiny plants, called lichen, start to grow
on the rocks. Each lichen grows approximately in the shape of a circle. The relationship
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(t  12) for t  12;
where d represents the diameter of the lichen in millimetres, and t represents the number
of years after the ice has disappeared.
In the two questions that followed students are asked to calculate (Q1) the diameter
of the lichen, 16 years after the ice disappeared and (Q2) the number of years that
the ice disappeared at a spot, where the diameter of some lichen is found to be 35
millimetres. Most obviously (Q1) and (Q2) can be answered based on knowledge on
subtracting, multiplying, taking roots, and the technique of substitution or trial and
error that students acquired over several years starting from the very rst grade. These
skills might have barely something to do with instruction in the ninth grade.
The vast majority of studies analyzing data from international student assessments
like PISA or TIMSS (Third International Math and Science Study) only considers instruc-
tional time at the relevant grade level as an explanatory for test performance. Usually,
these snap-shot-type measures of instructional time are drawn either from students
self-reporting or from test add-ons such as principals questionnaires as, for example, in
Baker et al. (2004), Lavy (2010), and Wössmann (2010). Given the serious error-in-
variables problem contained in these measures, it does not come as a surprise that their
impact on student test scores is mostly estimated as not statistically di¤erent from zero
(as, for example, in Wössmann 2010). Besides studies that use snap-shot query-based
measures, there are few studies that rely on the length of a school day and/or the length
of a school year to proxy instructional time as input in an education production or more
general Mincer-type framework (Dewey et al. 2000, Lee and Barro 2001, Pischke 2007).
Two exceptional studies that try to consider, at least, partially the cumulative nature of
learning are Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006) and Moser and Angelone (2009). The rst of
these studies makes use of a variable intended instruction time in public institutions in
hours per year for the 12 to 14-year-olds cumulated for the three years preceding the
PISA 2003 tests for 25 di¤erent countries. Similarly, Moser and Angelone (2009) also
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partially accumulate instructional time in Swiss cantons from seventh to ninth grade to
estimate its impact on PISA 2006 scores. Again, as expected given the rough approxi-
mation of total instructional time for both studies there is no clear-cut evidence for the
inputachievement relationship. Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006) nd no signicant evi-
dence. The evidence reported in Moser and Angelone (2009) is mixed and depends on
the subject studied. A signicant positive association is found for instructional time and
test scores in math.
Our study contributes along two lines to the literature. First, it addresses the outlined
serious error-in-variables problem and implied shortcoming in empirical work on educa-
tion inputs and outcomes measured by international student test scores by using data
on total instructional time that students were exposed to from rst to ninth (i.e. test
date) grade by subject. Secondly, besides quantifying the actual impact of cumulative
instructional time on PISA test scores, we address model uncertainty and robustness,
which are also issues that are widely ignored in the literature, by using extreme bound
analysis (EBA) techniques for our estimates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our data and used
methods. Section 3 reports and discusses our ndings. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
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2 Data and methodology
2.1 Data
Data on student achievement are drawn from the national extension of the PISA studies
in 2000, 2003, 2006 (PISA-E) and from the rst so-called Ländervergleich 2009, that is,
the follow-up study of PISA-E. PISA as well as the Ländervergleich test representative
samples of 15-year-old students in math, science and reading literacy (in 2003 also in
problem solving  in 2009, exclusively in reading and English). PISA-E used the same
tests as the international PISA study. Apart from high schools, profound variation in the
tracking and tracking systems among the remaining school types makes a comparison of
student achievement across German states for these types of schools virtually impossible
(Prenzel et al. 2008). Some of the remaining school types actually not even exist in
each German state. This system heterogeneity is not an issue for high schools, on which
we will focus in the following. The PISA-E tests sample size is several times the one
of the international tests comprising two overlapping samples of 15-year-olds and ninth
graders. Each sample covers about 40,000 students made of state samples ranging from
1,600 to 5,000 students for the 16 German federal states. Since German condentiality
requirements preclude the use of student-level data across states, one is restricted to use
pooled state-level data.1 German states mean performance is measured on a standardized
scale: Just like for any PISA and/or PISA-E participating OECD country, state or
province, scores for each subject and year are centered to an OECD mean of 500 and a
standard deviation of 100. All our regressions include dummy variables for year and test
subject, respectively.
Our data on instructional time are compiled from the respective state by-laws, taking
into account amendments of ordinances, correcting for festivities and celebrations, such
as state-wide holidays and any changes over time in these regulations for the period of
1Pooling is a common practice in the literature. An example for pooling subjects is Eren and
Millimet (2007). Pooling German states and merging in data on aggregate countries is done in
Wössmann (2010). Coates (2003) also considers pooling three test years.
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observation. We followed the respective PISA cohorts from rst to ninth grade. First to
fourth grade concerns elementary school, fth to ninth grade concerns high school (re-
ferred to as Gymnasium in German). For each of the 16 states, we construct an annual
instructional time variable that is summed up to CIT. The data used in the construction
of the variable come from several sources. The major part is drawn from administrative
regulations, which can be found in o¢cial ministerial and/or school administration docu-
ments or in law and ordinance gazettes of the states. For some federal states, information
on instructional time is given in special by-laws, so-called Stundentafelverordnungen,
as well as in regulations and mandates concerning training, examination and school rules
such as the Bavarian Volksschulordnung (VSO) for elementary schools and the Gym-
nasialschulordnung (GSO) for high schools. In case of doubt and missing data, we
obtained the information from the respective ministry of education and cultural a¤airs.
Data on weighting schemes for a di¤erent intra-state distribution of teaching focus at
the high school level (natural sciences, modern languages, math, etc.) is drawn from the
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Figure 2. Math and reading scores across states; PISA-E cohorts 2000/03/06/09
As reliable data on CIT, constructed according to the strategy sketched above, cannot
be obtained for all test subjects, we restrict our analysis to math and reading. We should
also be clear about the point that we do not consider unscheduled shortfall, homework,
individual tutoring or private study taken before or after school. In sum, we comprise
total curricular hours of the four test cohorts accumulated from year of primary school
enrollment (1991/92, 1994/95, 1997/1998, 2000/2001) to test year (2000, 2003, 2006,
2009).
Pooling PISA-E and Ländervergleich data for math and reading over states, tested
subjects (math, reading), and cohorts allows us to rely on a sample of 112 observations.2
As can be seen from Figure 1 and Figure 2,3 German states substantially di¤er both in
test scores and cumulative instruction by subject. For the distributions shown in Figure
216 states, two subjects (math and reading) for three cohorts plus reading for the test cohort
of 2009 amounts to 16 2 3 + 16 = 112. It is frequently claimed that studies relying on data
at the level of states or districts su¤er from an aggregation bias. Coates (2003) argues that
the profession has not yet reached a consensus on whether such bias tends to produce spurious
resource e¤ects or not. According to Wössmann (2010) aggregation bias is not an issue in the
case of marginal e¤ects estimated using German state-level data.
3The following abbreviations are used: Berlin (BE), Brandenburg (BR), Baden-Wurttemberg
(BW), Bavaria (BY), Bremen (HB), Hamburg (HH), Hesse (HE), Mecklenburg-West Pomerania
(MP), Lower Saxony (NI), North Rhine-Westphalia (NW), Rhineland-Palatinate (RP), Saar-
land (SA), Schleswig-Holstein (SH), Saxony (SN), Saxony-Anhalt (ST), Thuringia (TH).
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1 and Figure 2, there are two central sources of variation: changes over the considered
four waves and across the two subjects. Aggregated over states the distributions behind
these two sources are shown in rst and second schedule of Figure 3 and Figure 4,
respectively. In order to check, whether it actually makes a di¤erence to consider CIT, we
also compared the snap-shot (i.e. only test year concerning) instruction time variable
used in Wössmann (2010, Table 2, p. 241, Table A.1, p. 266) for PISA-E 2003 and
subject math4 with our corresponding cumulative measure. The correlation is statistically
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Figure 4. PISA-E test scores state-means distributions
4The variable is constructed based on the PISA 2003 student questionnaire, in particular,
on Q35b, Section F: Your mathematics classes. It reads as follows: In the last full week you
were in school, how many class periods did you spend in mathematics? (OECD 2003, p. 24).
65
2.2 Baseline estimates
To analyze the impact of CIT on students test performance we rely on empirical models
close to the ones common in the literature on education or more specically on cognitive
achievement production functions. See, among others, Hanushek (2002), Todd and
Wolpin (2003), Fuchs and Wössmann (2007), and Wössman (2003, 2010). Our baseline
specications are standard in the sense that we consider besides our central regressor
(CIT) also sets of control variables that include measures of social environment and
institutional features at the state level.
Table 1. Baseline estimates: PISA-E 2000, 2003, 2006













Included set of controls
a) Economic x x x
b) Social x x
c) Educational x
N obs 96 96 96
Adj. R-Squ. (percent) 63.63 74.87 69.87



















Note: Estimates include subject and year dummies; , ,  denotes signicance at 10, 5,
1% level, respectively; p-values in parentheses; controls dened in text (and Appendix B).
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Table 2. Baseline estimates: PISA-E 2000, 2003, 2006, Ländervergleich 2009













Included set of controls
a) Economic x x x
b) Social x x
c) Educational x
N obs 112 112 112
Adj. R-Squ. (percent) 62.35 64.98 71.61



















Note: Estimates include subject and year dummies; , ,  denotes signicance at 10, 5,
1% level, respectively; p-values in parentheses; controls dened in text (and Appendix B).
Concretely, in order to get a rst assessment of the relationship, we estimate the
following specications





jXg;jit + "it; (1)
where Sit denotes test scores; index i and t refer to state and test period, respectively. We
consider up to three sets of control variables, i.e., Xg=1; :::; Xg=3, consisting of k1 = 6 eco-
nomic and political economy variables, k2 = 8 social environment and socio-demographic
variables, and k3 = 9 education policy and institutional variables, respectively. The max-
imummagnitude of conditioning variables amounts to k1+k2+k3 = 23. SetX1 (economic
controls) comprises conservative party shares of governments (Cons), per capita (p.c.)
public indebtedness (Debt), p.c. disposable income (Disp), population densities (Dens),
unemployment rates (Unemp), and p.c. GDP (GDP) gures. Set X2 (social controls)
consists of data on last and rst cohorts experiencing secondary school fees (Fee, Fee2 ),
female employment rates (Fem), shares of foreign population (For), segregation measured
by the share of 15-year-olds attending high school (Seg), shares of students with migra-
tion background (Mig), and dummies for East Germany (East) and city-state (City).
Finally, set X3 (education controls) considers secondary school years to nal grade, i.e.,
either 8 or 9 years track (G9 ), average class sizes, student-teacher-ratios, instructional
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hours per teacher, and shares of part-time teachers in elementary school (CS1, ST1, HT1,
PT1 ) and in secondary I (CS2, ST2, HT2, PT2 ), respectively. For further detail and
sources of variables see Appendix B. A brief summary on how these variables might a¤ect
student test scores is given in Appendix B.
Controlling for state xed e¤ects i addresses the qualication of unobserved het-
erogeneity across states. In particular, this concerns such unobservables as pedagogical
quality, performance, and e¤ectiveness of teachers across states (Hanushek 2006b) as
well as di¤erences in the quality of educating teachers. It also implies the quality of
text books, instructional methods and materials, and the administration and organiza-
tion of curricula. For all these dimensions each German state has its own choice and
responsibility. As can be seen from the respective rst three (common constant model)
and last three columns of estimates shown in Table 1 and Table 2, a signicant positive
e¤ect from CIT on test scores is robust to the inclusion of state xed e¤ects. In fact,
our estimates controlling for xed e¤ects do not markedly di¤er from the ones obtained
from regressions without considering state e¤ects. In specication (1), we follow the most
recent cross-country study by Lavy (2010) in allowing for concavity in the functional re-
lationship f () between student performance and CIT. As can be seen from the estimates
reported in Table 1 and Table 2, this more exible specication accords with the data,
although less than ten percent of cases lie to the right of the implied upper turning point
(Figure 5). For the remaining vast majority of data points in the scatter diagram, the
relationship between CIT and test scores is close to linear. As Figure 5 is based on the
estimates reported in the last three columns of Table 2, including state xed e¤ects, it
does not show ordinate values. Hence, we interpret it only qualitatively as lending sup-
port to a weakly concave, nearly linear relationship. In the estimates reported in Table
1, we abstracted from using data from the Ländervergleich 2009, which in contrast to
the preceding PISA-E tests did not test math skills of students. Again, the results are
qualitatively not sensitive to the inclusion of the 2009 (reading) scores (Table 2). We
leave all further quantitative interpretation of estimates for section 3, reporting results
from our sensitivity analysis of the bearing CIT has on student test performance. In the
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following, we outline how we achieve robustness by addressing model uncertainty in an
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Figure 5. Relationship between CIT and test scores
2.3 Addressing model uncertainty: methodology
In order to address model uncertainty, we subject our empirical model to an extreme
bounds analysis (EBA) as originally suggested by Leamer (1983, 1985) and Levine and
Renelt (1992) and extended and modied by Granger and Uhlig (1990) and Sala-i-Martin
(1997). The use of EBA techniques is fairly popular in the empirics of economic growth
literature. However, its use is not limited to growth regressions. For recent applications
in other contexts see Sturm et al. (2005) and Mossa (2009). Yet, we are not aware of
an EBA application in the area of education production function estimates. In general,
EBA does not include the use of state (or country) xed e¤ects to take account of
unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, in the present context the use of state xed e¤ects
implies that di¤erent average student PISA test scores between states are not explained
but represented by dummy variables. Thus, all that can be explained by these regressions
are reactions of test scores over time (see, in a similar context, Kirchgässner 2011, p. 17),
which show a comparatively lower variation than the distribution of scores across states.
See the distributions shown in Figure 2 as opposed to the ones shown in the rst diagram
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of Figure 4. Following this argumentation and adhering to the EBA practice in the
literature, we abstract from the inclusion of state dummies as well as from nonlinear
specications. Both modications have shown to be not critical for an assessment of the
relationship between CIT and student test scores (section 2.2).
Hence, our general EBA specication reads






kZkit + it; (2)
where Vj represents a set of important variables included in every regression. It contains
a dummy for subject math as well as dummy variables identifying the respective year.
Zk is a set of three up to eleven out of 23 possible conditioning variables (section 2.2),
where the minimum number of such conditioners (= 3) follows the suggestion in Levine
and Renelt (1992). To identify di¤erences between the impact of CIT on average PISA-E
test scores and of CIT on scores of top and bottom percentile students of each cohort,
we also consider TopX% and BotX% as dependent variables. To check for robustness,
the strategy is to consider all possibleM = n!=(k!(n k)!) regression models that can be
estimated by taking combinations of k out of the 23 Z-variables, that is, 1; 771 models for
k = 3 up to 1; 352; 078 models for k = 11. For this elaborated sensitivity analysis we also
address for every single regression in the procedure possible problems of multicollinearity
by dropping models with a variance ination factor (VIF) for the exogenous at stake
exceeding a value of four.5
As proposed by Levine and Renelt (1992), so-called extreme bounds of estimates
can be used to check whether a variable like CITit in eq. (2) is fragile or robust. They are
made of lower and upper bound. The former is dened as the lowest estimated value for
M minus two standard deviations, the latter as the highest estimated value for M plus
two standard deviations. If lower and upper extreme bound for estimated  coe¢cients
show the same sign, the explanatory variable at stake is said to be robustly related to
the dependent variable.
5A V IFj for some exogenous variable xj is dened as V IFj = 1=(1  R
2
j ), where goodness-
of-t measure R2j refers to a regression of xj on all other independent variables in the respective
model. For zero collinearity V IFj takes on a value of one.
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A critical aspect of EBA-techniques in their original version proposed by Leamer
(1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) is that extreme bounds may be resultant from
models that are unreasonable in terms of a corresponding relatively low R2 statistics.
A modied EBA procedure addressing this problem is suggested by Granger and Uhlig
(1990). Their idea is to consider only those M estimates stemming from models that
reach R2 statistics corresponding to a certain percentage of the R2max of all M estimated
models, taking into account the goodness-of-t R2min of the basic model (leaving out
the control for conditioning variables, i.e.,
Xm
k=1
kZki). This approach is referred to as
reasonable extreme bounds analysis (REBA) in the literature. For model specications
with R2-values equal to or greater than





where 0 <  < 1 and for small -values, we consider corresponding specications as being
reasonable specications as they are not too far o¤ from the best model of the M
considered ones in terms of goodness-of-t as measured by the adjusted R2.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that a single regression for which the sign of the coe¢cient
 changes or becomes insignicant su¢ces according to original EBA or REBA standards
that a variable is identied to be non-robust. He assesses this procedure as a too hard to
pass test for almost any variable at stake: if the distribution of the parameter of interest
has some positive and some negative support, then one is bound to nd one regression for
which the estimated coe¢cient changes signs if enough regressions are run (Sala-i-Martin
1997, p. 179). This insight led Sala-i-Martin to introduce a newly modied approach
by moving away from the extreme test and instead assigning some level of condence by
looking at the entire distribution of the estimators of M . For each of the M estimated
models the likelihood LM , the point estimates M , and the standard deviation M are
calculated. They are used to construct the mean estimate of  and the average variance



















Once the mean and the variance of the distribution of , assumed to be normal,6 are
known, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be calculated using the standard
normal distribution. The level of condence for the variable of interest is dened as the
larger of the two areas under the probability density function (PDF) left and right from
zero.7 In order to be as comprehensive as possible, we apply all three methods, that is,
standard EBA, REBA, and EBA in the modied version of Sala-i-Martin (1997), hence-
forth SiM-EBA. Primarily this is done to check the robustness of the association between
CIT and PISA scores, letting k vary between 3 and 11. Going beyond this primary
sensitivity analysis, we also scrutinize the impact of the other 23 potential explanatories
(see Appendix B for detail) on our measure of cognitive achievement Sit relying on the
considered portfolio of EBA-techniques.
6The normality assumption is justied on the grounds of the central limit theorem as can be
seen from Figures 5 to 7.
Also see Figures A1 - A3 in Appendix A for respective Q-Q-Plots.
7We follow Sala-i-Martin (1997) by referring to the larger of the two areas as CDF(0)
irrespective of whether the area lies actually above or below zero.
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3 Results
3.1 Cumulative instructional time
Results for all three EBA methods outlined above are reported for three di¤erent (max-
imum) numbers of variables sampled into the conditioning set, i.e., for k = 3; k = 5,
and k = 11, in Table A.3, Table A.4, and Table A.5 of Appendix A, respectively. In
the interpretation of these ndings, we will follow Sala-i-Martin and focus on the entire
distribution (SiM-EBA) and only discuss results from the other two procedures if they
deviate from the SiM-EBA based nding. For all used dependent variables, CIT shows
a positive signicant impact on scores that is robust if we consider di¤erent subperiods,
even if we apply CDF(0) > 0:95 as more strict criterion of robustness. A rst point to
note is that variation in k does not qualitatively alter our results as can be seen from
Table A.3 to A.5 in Appendix A. Figures 6 to 8 make the point by showing the respective
distribution of estimated  coe¢cients for di¤erent k (the black line drawn through the
respective diagram shows the kernel density, while the grey line depicts the normal PDF
as a reference case). The distributions virtually have the same mean, while the variance,
of course, decreases with k and the number of estimated models M . CDF(0) remains
above a value of 0.95 going from k = 11 to k = 3, that is, narrowing the number of
variables contained in the conditioning set. This suggests for the sake of e¢ciency, that
is, for the sake of estimating rather 33,649 (k = 5) than 1.35 million (k = 11) models
for di¤erent test waves or subsets of pooled waves (Table 3), to concentrate the further
analysis on k = 5. Table 3 reports these results for all students scores as well as for
the top-5% and top-10% and the bottom-5% and bottom-10% of students in terms of
test scores. Since for Ländervergleich 2009 no score data by percentile is available our
analysis for bottom-/top-end students is restricted to the PISA-E waves 2000, 2003, and
2006. For the overall test scores as dependent, we consider besides the total pool also
a corresponding data set restricted to the year 2000 only and one that leaves out the
Ländervergleich 2009, when math has not been tested. The year 2K test sub-sample
captures the e¤ect of the rst year in which the test was conducted. In this sense, it can
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be seen as relatively free from e¤ects induced by policies that the states started in the
aftermath of the rst test. This is due to the fact that results from the PISA-E 2000 tests
were widely published and extensively discussed in the media and in political debates
(Tillmann et al. 2008, Pütz 2008). As can be seen from Table 3, we also considered total
and sub-set sample separately for math and reading sub-samples. The fourth column of
Table 3 displays the unweighted mean of M for M = 33; 649: Multiplying these gures
with an average of 360 (= 409) school weeks over the nine years from rst grade to test
date, we can calculate the approximate e¤ect of a policy corresponding to one additional
hour of instructional time per week over the total learning period. It is shown in the
fth column of Table 3. Finally, the last column in Table 3 reports CDF(0) values from
applying the SiM-EBA method. As can be seen from the third line of results displayed
in Table 3, the above described stylized policy e¤ect of CIT on scores amounts to siz-
able 11.59 test-score points or roughly 12 percent of an international standard deviation.
Dropping the Ländervergleich 2009 data the e¤ect increases to more than 13 percent.
The largest average impact of a one hour per week increase policy is calculated, when
one restricts the sample to the rst year when German states ran the OECD PISA test
for the rst time, i.e. for PISA-E 2000. It amounts to nearly 17 percent of an inter-
national standard deviation. For the sub-samples separating subjects, we nd that the
e¤ect is particularly pronounced for math (> 16 percent) but still sizable, that is, above
12 percent of an international standard deviation, for reading. Looking at upper and
lower percentiles of test scores, we nd that all students would benet from an increase
in CIT. The CITscore relationship is, however, more pronounced for the bottom-end














.02 .025 .03 .035 .04 .045
betas
Figure 6. Distribution of estimated betas for
SiM EBA: k = 3, pool: 00/03/06/09, math/reading
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Figure 7. Distribution of estimated betas for
SiM EBA: k = 5, pool: 00/03/06/09, math/reading
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Figure 8. Distribution of estimated betas for
SiM EBA: k = 11, pool: 00/03/06/09, math/reading
M = 1; 352; 078 models, N = 112 observations
To get an impression of what 16 percent of an international standard deviation is
actually to mean, consider the following experiment of thought: Under the assumption
that the policy of increasing the instructional time by one additional hour per week over
the total learning period has a similar impact on scores for other secondary school types
as it has for high schools, we can calculate the consequences in the rankings, interpreting
German states as a microcosm for OECD countries (Wössmann 2010). Take OECD
PISA 2006, in which German students ranked 14th in math compared to the other OECD
test participating countries; see Table A.7 in Appendix A. An increase by 16 percent of
the standard deviation (normed to 100) of this test would correspond to running up
six ranks up to rank 8. In contrast, cutting CIT down by one hour per week would
correspond to a drop in the ranking down to rank 24. Similar e¤ects can be calculated
for reading.
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All results reported in Table 3 are robust in the sense of Sala-i-Martin (1997).8 CDF(0)
values range between 0.9736 to 0.9999. As can be seen from detailed Tables A.3, A.4,
and A.5 in Appendix A, virtually all values for lower and upper bounds show positive
signs, conrming the highly robust positive e¤ect of CIT on PISA test-scores.
Table 3. Impact of CIT on PISA-E tets-scores: SiM-EBA (k = 5; Z = 23)
Dependent Test year Test subject Beta (mean) Policy e¤ect CDF(0)
Score 2000 math/reading 0.0468 16.87 0.9736
Score 00/03/06 math/reading 0.0364 13.12 0.9992
Score 00/03/06/09 math/reading 0.0321 11.59 0.9976
Score 00/03/06/09 reading 0.0340 12.27 0.9987
Score 00/03/06 reading 0.0412 14.84 0.9996
Score 00/03/06 math 0.0456 16.44 0.9999
Bot5% 00/03/06 math/reading 0.0444 16.00 0.9960
Bot10% 00/03/06 math/reading 0.0421 15.17 0.9980
Top10% 00/03/06 math/reading 0.0323 11.63 0.9961
Top5% 00/03/06 math/reading 0.0266 9.57 0.9790
Note: Policy e¤ect is one additional hour of CIT per week over total learning period.
3.2 Other robust determinants of cognitive achievement
In order to analyze which of the remaining 23 available explanatories (see Appendix B
for detail) have a robust impact on test scores, we rely on the same portfolio of EBA-
techniques as for CIT in the preceding paragraphs. Table 4 below summarizes the results
for this exercise reported in detail in Table A.6, for which we set k = 3 (M = 1; 771)9
and consider the 00/03/06/09math/reading pool with N = 112 observations for each of
8Re-running our estimates relying on a snap-shot measure like the ones discussed in the
introduction and used, for example, by Wössmann (2010), throughout generates results that
are not robust (fragile) in the sense of any conventional EBA-criterion (EBA, REBA, SiM-
EBA). Results are available on request from the authors.
9As for CIT, results are qualitatively una¤ected by setting k = 5 (M = 33; 649).
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the M estimated models. As central criterion of robustness we again apply the modied
SiM-EBA criterion, i.e. CDF(0) > 0.95.10
At the federal state level, public indebtedness (Debt), disposable income (Disp), pop-
ulation density (Dens), and the unemployment rate (Unemp), each measured for the year
corresponding to the respective PISA-E test-year, as well as a dummy for East German
states (East) are found to be robustly and negatively associated with test scores accord-
ing to the modied SiM-EBA criterion. Drawn from the respective PISA cohort data,
also the share of 15 years old students with migrational background (Mig) is identied as
robust negative correlate with scores. By this standard robust education policy variables
are the number of secondary school years to exit exam (G9 ) and average class size in
secondary I (CS2 ).
Table 4. Robust and weakly robust determinants of PISA-E test-scores besides CIT
SiM-EBA (k = 3, Z = 23)
Category Variable Beta (mean) CDF(0)




Social environment Mig -0.501y 0.988
East -8.931y 0.999
Education policy G9 -5.770y 0.984
CS2 -0.335y 0.979
Note: ySiM-EBA, REBA: robust, standard EBA: fragile
yySiM-EBA: robust; standard EBA, REBA: fragile
The only variable that measures up to CIT with regard to meeting all robustness cri-
teria of the considered portfolio of EBA-techniques is public indebtedness per inhabitant.
10Note, applying the less strict CDF(0) > 0.90 instead, as originally proposed in Sala-i-
Martin (1997), also identies variables average class size in elementary schools (CS1 ), average
instructional hours per teacher in elementary schools (HT1 ) and segregation (SEG) as robust
determinants of student achievement.
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It proxies the cost e¤ectiveness of incumbent and former governments of the respective
state. In terms of size, the estimated average coe¢cient (< 0) of the dummy for an East
German state (East) stands out. This is, in particular, due to the poor performance
of students from the East German state of Brandenburg (BR) as well as to the below
national average achievement in terms of math and reading test scores of the two East
German states Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (MP) and Saxony-Anhalt (ST); see Figure
2. It is also these states of the ve East German ones that are known for their notori-
ously unsound economic and demographic status characterized by a substantial number
of movers to the Western states in the decades following German unication. The average
negative impact of the institutional grade conguration variable G9 on test scores also is
relatively sizable.11 The e¤ect is negative and amounts to about six percent of an inter-
national standard deviation. It is straightforward to attribute this e¤ect to di¤erences in
the density of curricula: Students might be comparatively more advanced in math and
reading skills in a system, where the nal exit exam takes place three rather than four
years after the PISA test date. State-level population densities, unemployment rates, and
shares of students with migration background show the expected sign (see Appendix B),
though being less strongly associated with lower test scores in terms of size of estimated
coe¢cients. Another education policy variable that is robust according to the modied
SiM-EBA criterion is average class size in secondary I (CS2 ). A decrease of CS2 by one
student over the nine years from enrollment (rst grade) to test year (ninth grade) is
robustly associated, however, with only a minor increase of 0.335 points or 0.335 percent
of an international standard deviation. In sum, the e¤ect of (education) policy variables
is either most probably resultant from PISA tests being not adjusted to di¤erences in
curricula or is quite small in size compared to the policy e¤ect of increasing CIT. The only
counter-intuitive and weakest, in terms of size, e¤ect is the negative average coe¢cient
for disposable income.
A nal caveat concerns the above interpretation of results reported in Table 4: Apart
11Variable G9 is a dummy that takes on a value of one if the number of secondary school years
to nal grade, that is, to Abitur, the German A-level equivalent, is nine as opposed to eight
years. It is up to each states discretionary education policy to set this length. East German
states traditionally practice an eight years system.
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from public indebtedness per inhabitant and CIT all other 22 considered determinants
of student achievement are either not robust or are fragile, at least, according to one
criterion in the used portfolio of EBA-procedures. Hence, they have both some positive
and some negative support (Table A.6).
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4 Conclusion
Econometric misspecication and failure to account for major determinants of student
achievement represent the central problem in correctly identifying the school inputs
student achievement relationship (Todd and Wolpin 2003). By relying on a portfolio
of extreme bounds analysis techniques as well as a newly compiled cross-state dataset
on cumulative instructional time from rst grade to ninth (i.e., OECD PISA-test date)
grade for German states, we addressed two fundamental shortcomings in the literature:
A serious error-in-variables problem due to using poor proxies of instructional time and
the widely ignored issue of model uncertainty. We nd that instructional time by sub-
ject, measured in cumulative terms, is a highly robust determinant of student cognitive
achievement. This nding is insensitive to the inclusion of state xed e¤ects and to
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Idiosyncratic potential determinants of student achievement in Germany
(a) Path-dependent and institutional variables
Segregation. It is straightforward to assume a negative relationship between the
relative share of a cohort of ninth graders attending high school (in Germany Gym-
nasium) and the average PISA-test score of this group of students (Baumert 2002,
p. 92, 124, 141). As a smaller proportion might reach better learning outcomes, the
selection of these students (those attending Gymnasium) might matter. Ultimately, a
negative relationship might indicate future academics being educated and promoted
better in smaller groups. Undesirable side eects are social disparities and inequity
(Hoxby 2000).
Family background and path dependency. The historical time of abolishment of sec-
ondary school fees at the federal state level in Germany can be seen as a path-
dependent determinant of student achievement. It is immanent to the respective
schooling system. For example, the state of Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) continued
to raise tuition fees for secondary education up to two decades after world war II.
According to the estimates of Riphahn (2011), the abolishment of these fees has in-
creased secondary school attendance by about six percent. The positive enrollment
eect is found to have been particularly pronounced for female students. This nding
suggests two lines of reasoning. First, families with a lower social status were able to
send their children to secondary school after the abolishment of fees. Ninth-graders of
the PISA-test cohorts 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 may have parents or grandparents
who were able to attain a high school degree after abolishment of fees. A correspond-
ing generation of parents or grandparents from another state, however, may not have
had this chance due to fees and hence may not have started a tradition of higher
education (rst-cohort-without eect). Secondly, the awareness of costs related to
secondary education witnessed by the last birth cohort who paid fees might matter
for today's students' work ethic as this awareness might have been passed on to next
generations (last-cohort-with eect). For a recent theoretical rationalization of both
arguments see Doepke and Zilibotti (2008).
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(b) Political economy factors
Conservative party eects. Post-war Germany witnessed a four-party and as of Ger-
man unication a ve-party representative democracy with two dominating parties:
the conservative Christian Democratic Union (in the state of Bavaria, BY: the Chris-
tian Social Union) and the left-of-center social democrats (SPD). Party platforms
dier in their education policy programs at the state-level.
(c) Socio-demographic framework
Socio-demographic conditions. Some authors nd for German states a signicant
positive impact of population density on the general support of education in a federal
state (Buttner et al. 2004). Thus, density might proxy a pro-education environment
with regard to public spending. On the other hand, particularly urbanized, densely
populated regions typically attract immigrants bearing potential adverse eects on
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1 Introduction
This study addresses the fundamental question of whether observed hybrid forms of fed-
eral governance, i.e., forms that are neither strictly decentralized nor strictly centralized,
in public education can be justied on theoretical as well as empirical grounds.
In Germany, for example, reforms of federal structures in 2006 have led to a less
standardized organization of the traditionally public education system. Major parts of
decision-making authorities have been allocated from the upper-tier government (Bund)
to the lower-tier governments of federal states (Länder). For public schooling an im-
plication is decentralization and an imminent heterogeneity with regard to structural
cornerstones such as tracking norms, the classication of education levels, and examina-
tion standards. The opposite applies, for example, to Switzerland, where the advisory
board of education directors in the 26 cantons1 opted for a reform designed to har-
monize and standardize existing cantonal education practices. The so-called HarmoS
reform program was enacted in 2009 in the form of a legally binding state treaty. Among
others, it denes superordinate targets for compulsory schooling, sets out guidelines of
quality assurance, and decrees mandatory educational standards across cantons.2 Thus,
while Switzerland moves away from a purely decentralized form of federal governance
of the education system, Germany seems to move towards it. Actually, more than ever
German education consists of 16 states sharing the same cultural and legal system but
pursuing idiosyncratic education policies (Schulte 2004, Wössmann 2010). According
to Goldin and Katz (2001) the high school movement, establishing the United States
20th century leadership in human capital (Goldin 2001, 2003) by rigorously expanding
secondary school to the masses and spreading over the Western world in the post-war
decades, will be replaced by an extensive accountability movement of education in the
21st century. Against this background of growing accountability, transparency, bench-
marking, and yardstick competition both at the federal and national level, the question
of optimal allocation of public education responsibilities has not been satisfyingly ad-
1Schweizerische Konferenz der kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren (EDK).
2For detail see http://www.edk.ch.
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dressed in the literature. In particular, it is unclear whether a federal government should
decide for either one of the polar forms of governance (centralized or decentralized) or for
a hybrid form of governance, where some rights that are more or less residual in nature
are left at either the government or the state level.
Our study addresses this question from a political economy perspective for a two-
tiered government in a representative democracy. To this end we set up a simple model
of political yardstick competition (Salmon 1987, Besley and Case 1995, Sand-Zantman
2004, Bodenstein and Ursprung 2005) with a Salmon Mechanism both at the upper-tier
as well as at the lower-tier government level. In our model voters are assumed to compare
performance measures of public education both across nations and across federal states.
Voting is supposed to be the main incentive mechanism to discipline incumbents with
regard to an e¢cient education policy. This is achieved by voters appraising incumbent
governments relative performances. The model results in strategic dilemma due to the
top ight of states getting a closed shop that is not interested in and possibly blocks
Pareto-improving policies as soon as these imply a shrinking relative performance for
states in this group. Using event study analysis techniques, we nd evidence for the
central drivers behind this nding, i.e., for relative performances in student achievement
tests impacting on vote and popularity (VP) functions of German national and state
government incumbents.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the route
from yardstick competition to strategic dilemma for hybrid forms of federal governance
and sets out our model. The empirical strategy and ndings are outlined and discussed
in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
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2 From yardstick competition to strategic dilemma
2.1 The international accountability movement
In the following, we consider the national extensions of the OECD Programme of Inter-
national Student Assessment (PISA) studies to illustrate the international accountability
movement, in particular, at the sub-national level of federally organized nations. The
PISA studies underlies a standardized test of 15-year-olds literacy in reading, math, and
science. As of 2000, the OECD repeated the test every three years. In Germany, the
national extensions of the worldwide test are referred to as PISA-E or Ländervergleich.
They test the cognitive achievement of representative samples of 15-year-old students as
a general rule also in math, science, and reading literacy. Habitually, the national exten-
sions use the same tests as the international PISA study. The sample size of the German
extension of the PISA test is several times the one of the international test comprising
two overlapping samples of 15-year-olds and ninth graders. Each sample covers about
40,000 students made of state samples ranging from 1,600 to 5,000 students for the 16
German federal states. Results are published several months after the international test
results. Performance at the state-level is measured on a standardized scale as is the case
at the supra-national level. For any OECD nation participating in PISA and/or testing
at the level of state or province, scores for each subject and year are for the sake of
comparability centered to an OECD mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100.
In general, models of yardstick competition (Salmon 1987, Besley and Case 1995,
Sand-Zantman 2004, Bodenstein and Ursprung 2005) assume voters to make comparisons
between jurisdictions. In this type of models voting is the main incentive mechanism
to discipline incumbents with regard to an e¢cient policy, for example, to an e¢cient
education policy. Voters discipline incumbent governments by appraising their relative
performance. This mechanism requires transparency, in the sense that voters can gain
access to information about what other incumbents are doing and the corresponding
achievements of some other entities students to serve as a benchmark for their own
incumbent governments policy. These entities can be nations or federal entities such as
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federal states or provinces.
Table 1. National extensions of PISA test participation of OECD countries 2000-2006
GER BEL AUS CH CAN BRA AUL MEX
No. federal entities 16 3 9 26 10 26 8 32
PISA-E tested entities
All types of schools 14-16 2  12-14 10  8 32
High schools 16 2  12-14 10  8 32
Coverage (minimum) 87.5% 66.7% 0% 53.8% 100% 0% 100% 100%
Notes:
GER  Germany, BEL  Belgium, AUS  Austria, CH  Switzerland, CAN  Canada, BRA 
Brazil, AUL  Australia, MEX  Mexico; PISA-E  national extension of PISA test
Brazil participated in PISA, although it is not an OECD economy; considered are only countries
(a) with federally organized public education sectors and (b) for which public education is the
primary form of education (for all type of schools).
As regards the OECD PISA test and its regional extensions, full information on
student achievement even just at the state-level is generally rather the exception than the
rule in an international comparison of federally organized countries (Table 1). Frequently
also condentiality requirements preclude the use of student-level data across states as is
the case for German Länder. Yet, for example, in Germany Länder-comparing PISA-E
tests are widely published and extensively discussed in the media and in political debates
(Tillmann et al. 2008, Pütz 2008).
2.2 Hybrid forms of federal governance: Germany
Proponents of a decentralized structure with full autonomy at the federal state level
argue along the following lines.3 A nationwide agreeing on and setting of binding edu-
cational norms, for instance, in the form of a minimum average student achievement in
standardized tests, would necessarily lead to a substandard decree (Schwager 2005). This
unavoidable result is attributed to an externality of democratic decision-making inherent
3See, for example, Schwager (2005) for the German education system and Rodden (2003) in
the more general context of scal federalism.
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to the federal system. The argument is simple and can straightforwardly be illustrated
by the following scenario of a hypothetical vote on a subordinate target value for stu-
dent performance in the German Council, i.e. the house of the German parliament that
represents the lower-tier state governments (Bundesrat). Suppose that for reasons of an
unspecied x-ine¢cient inertia each federal state wants to stick to its realized (average)
level of student performance and proposes the respective gure as the new superordinate
target. The total number of seats in the council corresponds to the accumulated number
of votes of states. Seats range from three to six, depending on the size of population in
the respective Bundesland. In total, seats and corresponding votes in the council sum up
to 69. As can be seen from Table 2, the highest educational standard capable of winning
an absolute majority ( 35 votes) in the Bundesrat would correspond to the proposal
made by the council members of the state of Hesse (H), Rhineland-Palatinate (RP), and
Brandenburg (BB) for PISA-E tests in 2000, 2003, and 2006, respectively. In all three
cases, the correspondingly proposed standard would fall below both the average student
performance of all test-participating states (penultimate row in Table 2) and the German
students average performance in the international test (ultimate row in Table 2) for the
respective test year.4
4As can be seen from Table 1 and Table 2, the city states of Hamburg and Berlin did
not (fully) participate in the PISA-E 2000 national extension of the international PISA study.
The only basis of comparison for these Länder in 2000 is given for high school students test
achievements.
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Table 2. German Laender PISA-E performances and seats in the Bundesrat.
Federal state PISA-E 2000 PISA-E 2003 PISA-E 2006
Bavaria (BY) 516 [1 6 6] 529 [1 6 6] 522 [2 6 10]
Baden-Württemberg (BW) 508 [2 6 12] 513 [3 6 16] 513 [3 6 16]
Saxony (SN) 502 [3 4 16] 519 [2 4 10] 525 [1 4 4]
Thuringia (TH) 495 [4 4 20] 506 [4 4 20] 513 [4 4 20]
Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) 491 [5 4 24] 496 [8 4 35] 505 [5 4 24]
Schleswig-Holstein (SH) 491 [6 4 28] 498 [5 4 24] 497 [11 4 47]
Saarland (SL) 487 [7 3 31] 497 [7 3 31] 502 [6 3 27]
Hesse (H) 484 [8 5 36] 494 [10 5 46] 500 [9 5 40]
M.-West Pomerania (MV) 484 [9 3 39] 490 [13 3 57] 498 [10 3 43]
North Rh.-Westphalia (NW) 483 [10 6 45] 489 [14 6 63] 495 [13 6 57]
Lower Saxony (NI) 483 [11 6 51] 495 [9 6 41] 493 [14 6 63]
Saxony-Anhalt (ST) 471 [12 4 55] 497 [6 4 28] 501 [7 4 31]
Brandenburg (BB) 469 [13 4 59] 490 [12 4 54] 500 [8 4 35]
Bremen (HB) 458 [14 3 62] 477 [16 3 69] 479 [16 3 69]
Hamburg (HH) 488 [15 3 66] 487 [15 3 66]
Berlin (BE) 493 [11 4 50] 497 [12 4 51]
Average (PISA national) 487 498 501
Germany (PISA international) 492 499 505
Notes:
Figures in squared brackets [a, b, c] denote a) rank, b) votes which correspond to seats in the
council, and c) cumulative votes, accumulated according to respective test years ranking.
As can be seen from Table 2 and Figure 1, there has been some dynamics with regard
to states changing ranks over the three considered test years from 2000 to 2006. However,
there is also some persistence as regards the top ight and bottom group of Länder in
terms of PISA test achievements. See respective upper-right and lower-left quadrant of
scatter plots shown in Figure 1.
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2.3 Hybrid forms of federal governance: A basic model
In the following basic model, we assume voters to compare states both at the national
as well as at the supra-national level with regard to one of their major concerns: a
successful education policy. As in the seminal models by Salmon (1987) and Besley
and Case (1995), voting is the main incentive mechanism to discipline incumbents in
order to follow a best practice education policy. To this end, we assume voters to be
able to appraise incumbents relative performance. This is a reasonable assumption as
voters have access to information about the educational success of other incumbents
both in a national and international comparison of student achievement rankings based
on standardized tests such as PISA-E and PISA. This fact forces incumbents both at
the federal state level and at the national level into a yardstick competition in which
they care about what other incumbents are doing. A straightforward rationalization
of this fact is rst to let the reelection probability of both the upper-tier government
U and lower-tier government L depend on the relative performance of students in an
international (OECD-wide) and national (across federal states) comparison of student
cognitive achievement, respectively. Hence, let




a ) ; (1)
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where f 0 > 0, i.e., the reelection probability of the national (n) incumbent upper-tier











j=1 aj for j = 1; :::; C countries participating in the student assessment program.
Thus, na  aj. And
Pr Li (re-elect = 1) = f (ai   
n
a) ; (2)
where again f 0 > 0, i.e., the reelection probability of the incumbent lower-tier government
L in state i increases with an above national (n) average performance of students.
Residual rights of U are such that the upper-tier government is allowed to make
proposals with regard to education policies that federal governments i can either accept
or reject by a majority vote. We assume that U makes Pareto-improving proposals only,
i.e., ai;1 > ai;0 for all i = 1; :::; F federal states, where index 1 denotes all periods after and
0 all periods before the reform is enacted. Suppose there is a sequence of such proposals
by U in each incumbent period ranging from t = 0 to T . In this setting, the house of
parliament representing the lower-tier governments (in the German case, the Bundesrat)
will after some adjustment period accept all proposals until states, for which ai > 
n
a ,
make up the median of the number of seats (s), i.e., until
es = inf fs 2 N : F (s)  0:5g (3)
is reached. The latter states will be indicated with an asterisk  in the following. In
an empirical representation like Figure 1 above, the assumed process would lead to more
and more states moving from the lower-left quadrant (bottom group) to the upper-right
quadrant (top group) as well as to a general upward tendency (Pareto-improvement) of
student achievements across all states. However, as soon as es is reached, i.e., the top
group holding > 50 percent of all votes, the stream of proposal acceptances is stopped.
The median voter of federal states required to reject a proposal by U is a state, in which
the average of student achievements in standardized tests lies above the national average.



















i.e., if the leading group of states expects the national average of student achievements
to grow faster and, hence, the bottom group to catch up faster than the top students









where T denotes end of incumbent period. In this case, where the national average
student achievement increases by more than the state-mean of student test scores in
the leading group of states increases, the potential Pareto-improvement implies that
above national average performing states improve their performance index by less than
student performances in below-average performing states would be improved. As it is
the relative di¤erence that matters with regard to the reelection probability of a federal
state incumbent government (eq. 2), the respective top-group governments will block the
proposal. The latter might represent a wide range of measures such as a new textbook
or newly developed teaching method for all states. In sum, although U only proposes
Pareto-improving policies for the federally organized public education system, a strategic
dilemma at the L-level prevents the realization of these policies.
It remains to clarify, why incumbent U should make Pareto-improving proposals,
given that it seeks to maximize (1), where wa is exogenous and inequity is not part of
its objective function. It could, for example, raise na and thus maximize its reelection
probability just by suggesting measures that further improve student achievements in the
top-group only. However, given that there are decreasing returns to policy measures, as
in the case of educational inputs in general (Lavy 2010, Mandel and Süssmuth 2011b),
assuming U to suggest Pareto-improving measures is a realistic scenario.
The linchpin mechanism of our basic model resulting in the above sketched strategic
dilemma for hybrid forms of federal governance consists of eqs. (1) and (2). The central
empirical question, hence, is to analyze whether these functions are in accordance with
data of a public education system adhering to such a hybrid form of federal governance.
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3 Evidence
In the following, we rely on polls data on stated voting intention to gauge actual voting
intentions and the popularity of ruling parties in Germany. Ultimately, we use these data
to proxy the reelection probability of incumbent governments. This is a frequent practice
of the empirical strand of the political economy literature; see Kirchgässner (1985) for
German federal elections, Carlsen (1997) for the US, and Wolfers and Leigh (2002) for
federal elections in Australia. Wolfers and Leigh (2002) comparing popularity polls out-
comes with projections from economic models and betting market data nd that polls
do a good job in accurately assessing both the popularity and reelection probabilities
of incumbents. This holds in particular over short-run, i.e. close to election, time hori-
zons which are the relevant ones with regard to our empirical strategy. Adhering to
the denition of VP-functions in the survey by Nannestad and Paldam (1994), our
strategy consists in conditioning VP-functions of both the Bundesregierung (upper-tier
government level) as well as the Landesregierungen, i.e., the federal states incumbent
governments (lower-tier government level) on relative performances in the outlined in-
ternational (PISA) and national (PISA-E) tests. Given the nature of our data, this is
respectively done in the framework of an event study analysis.
3.1 Event study analysis: Upper-tier government
As our period of investigation at the U -level, we choose the period from the month
following the election to the Lower House of German Parliament (Bundestag) in fall 1998
to the month of the rst advance notice of the PISA 2009 test results in June 2010. The
dotted vertical lines in Figure 2 mark the months corresponding to the three elections
covered by our sample, while the vertical solid lines give the months in which the PISA
test scores have been published.5 As our proxy of reelection probabilities we consider data
on stated voting intentions from the most popular popularity poll in Germany, referred
5Notice, these dates do not correspond to the announcements of results from the national
extensions of tests, i.e., PISA-E 2000, PISA-E 2003 and PISA-E 2006, that were announced
later and independently.
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to as Sonntagsfrage.6 The poll is run by one of the major psephological institutes in
Germany. The same source of polls data (now: Infratest-dimap   then: Infratest) has
been used by Kirchgässner (1985) to measure voting intentions of German voters and
to estimate VP-functions of parties for the Federal Republic of Germany from 1971 to
1982. The underlying sample is representative and the poll has been conducted, at least,
once a month over our period of observation. If there is more than one gure on voting
intention per month, we take monthly averages of voting shares attracted by parties.































































































































































































Union SPD FDP Linke.PDS B90/Grüne others Incumbent
Note: Dotted (solid) vertical lines mark months of elections (of PISA results publication)
In order to assess the impact of German students relative performance in the three
national PISA test results (na) on stated voting intention, we estimate a stylized Fair-
type model (Fair 1978, 1996, Feld and Kirchgässner 2000, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier
2000) of the incumbents percentage of votes and include a term to capture the an-
nouncement of the relative performance in the international PISA 2000, 2003, and 2006
6This is due to the fact that the central question in the poll reads: Who would you vote if
elections were next Sunday?.
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test, respectively.7




2000)] + 1A2003 + 2A2006 + GKt + t; (6)









+ A2006 + GKt + t; (7)









+ GKt + t; (8)
where j1 = 2000; 2003; j2 = 2000; 2003; 2006, and Xt denotes the Fair-set of conditioners
made up by monthly gures of the unemployment rate, the ination rate (computed from
growth rates of the CPI), and the growth rate in real total production. Corresponding
time series in monthly frequency were obtained from the German Federal Employment
Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) and the Federal Statistics O¢ce (Statistisches Bun-
desamt). Summary statistics are given in Table A.1 in the Appendix. GKt represents
a dummy, taking on a value of one during the time of the coalition formed by the two
dominating German post-war parties, CDU and SPD, i.e., during the so-called Große
Koalition. As can be seen from Figure 2, it is obviously necessary to control for this
coalition due to the higher incumbent governments VP-shares after October 2005. For
the considered period, Vt corresponds to the share of voters intending to vote the incum-
bent government or coalition. For an event study analysis, the choice of the time slot for
investigation is critical. In our case, we focus on the time window from the month of the
respective PISA test results announcement to the month of the next Bundestag election.
The idea is to check for a structural break in the form of a permanent shock8 beginning
with the announcement of the PISA test score to the month of the next announcement or
to the month of the next election: A2000 identies the period from the announcement of
PISA 2000 (December 2001) to the announcement of PISA 2003 (December 2004), A2003
7The following specication disregards several central determinants of popularity discussed in
voting theory, including campaigns, issues, candidates, quality of challengers, and party identi-
cation (PID). However, given scarcity of aggregate data and the notoriously good performance
of Fair-type models in predicting election outcomes, we are condent to rely on a fairly good
second best choice.
8Basic tests to check, wether the announcement e¤ect is temporary rather than permanent
in nature, speak in favor of a permament e¤ect. Additionally, the inclusion of a time trend into
our specications does qualitatively not alter our results.
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identies the period from the announcement of PISA 2003 to the following election of
September 2005, which was lost by the incumbent (Red/Green) coalition. Finally, A2006
identies the period from the announcement of PISA 2006 (December 2007) and the
time where rst information about the PISA 2009 results were published (June 2010).
In specications (6) to (8), the relative performance of German students is measured
by the expression in round brackets, where the respective n denotes the national and
w the corresponding international mean test score. With regard to the sign of coe¢-
cients b, estimates consistent with our basic model require in any case a positive sign.
Discriminating specications (6) to (8) allows us to assess whether the e¤ect of relative
performance was particularly pronounced for the early PISA tests, especially, the rst
one ever in 2000, compared to the later ones. The stigmatization of German education
policy by the rst PISA shock is a widely held belief (Schwager 2005, Tillmann et al.
2008).
For all three equations, we also consider as alternative specications, the replace-
ment of the Fair-set of conditioners with a rst order autoregressive, AR(1), part of the
dependent variable Vt. Estimation results are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Incumbent government VP-functions and international PISA test results
Fair-type model Autoregressive model




















adj. R2 0:95 0:95
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adj. R2 0:94 0:94
N obs. 142 133 142 133
Note: t-values in parentheses (Newey and West 1987): ; ;  signicant at 10, 5, 1% level
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One may be concerned that some serious omitted variable bias plagues these estimates
as central domestic and foreign-policy events and shocks were not controlled for. In par-
ticular, there were several major inuential events associated with the months Septem-
ber/October 2001, March/April 2002, August/September 2002, March/April 2003 and
September/October 2008 that require a special treatment. The political momentousness
of the 09/11 attacks and the shoulder-to-shoulder stance of Chancellor Schröder with
President Bush should have contributed exceptionally to the popularity of the incum-
bent government. As a result of the following military actions, in March 2002 the rst
German soldiers died in Afghanistan, triggering a discussion about the political need of
the mission. In the summer before the 2002 federal election Germany witnessed a hun-
dred year ood, where due to the ooding of the Elbe River mainly East German regions
were concerned. During August and September 2002 30,000 people got evacuated and
more than 20 died. The incumbent government promised transfers and reconstruction
funds amounting to 10 bn. Euros. The planned tax reform for 2003 was o¢cially delayed
due to this exceptional event. The gain in popularity for the incumbents through this
taking measures is common knowledge today. In March 2003 the second Persian Gulf
War started. After a massive air strike coalition ground forces invaded Iraq. By mid-
April, Saddam Husseins army and government had collapsed. The German incumbents
corporate position against the invasion of Iraq also most probably a¤ected its popularity.
Finally, in September 2008 the nancial crisis started to spread over the world with the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which also reasonably a¤ected the popularity of the
incumbent coalition.
In event study analyses, a straightforward practice to treat exceptional and inuential
events simply consists of dropping these observations from the sample; see, for example,
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). Leaving out our monthly data associated with 09/11,
the Afghanistan conict, the Elbe Flood, the Persian Gulf War, and the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers decreases our sample from 142 to 133 events. As can be seen from
columns three and six in Table 3, our results are nearly una¤ected by excluding these
outliers.
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3.2 Event study analysis: Lower-tier governments
As polls data for German Länder governments are available at discontinuous frequency
only, the 16 di¤erent voting intention series at the federal state-level rarely consist of
more than 100 observations for our period of investigation.9 As they are constituted
of in-equidistant events at the state-level, pooling the data and using within-estimators
that control for xed e¤ects is not feasible. Thus, we have to resort to state-by-state
estimations to test linchpin mechanism (2) of our basic model. An event study practice
that has been successfully applied in similar empirical models, though in widely di¤erent
contexts, is a one stage specication with a lower order autoregressive term and a dummy
variable introducing events like announcements, accidents as the Chernobyl nuclear ac-
cident, etc. For our state-level event study analysis it appears to be the appropriate one.
It is followed, for example, in Kalra et al. (1997), Berman et al. (2000), and Veraros et
al. (2004). In analogy to the preceding sections estimates, we specify
Vi; = V i + 1;iVi; 1+
b1;i
 












i; + GKi;t + t; (9)
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 + GKi;t + t; (10)









+ GKi;t + t; (11)
where j1 = 2000; 2003; j2 = 2000; 2003; 2006, for all i = 1; :::16 Länder over the di¤erent
discontinuous points of observation  . Vi; represents the voting intentions in terms of
vote percentages for the incumbent coalition or single ruling party.10
In event study analyses interaction terms as, for instance, the direction (cut vs. in-
crease) or reversals of interest rate target changes by the central bank (Bernanke and
Kuttner 2005) usually are of particular interest. In our case this concerns the discrep-
9We draw our series from the wahlrecht.de database which comprises opinion polls data for
the 16 Länder from di¤erent sources, i.e. from various psephological institutes. For detail see
http://wahlrecht.de/umfragen/landtage.
10Note, we account for in-sample changes in the Länder governments by simply adjusting the
gures to the respective newly elected party or newly formed coalition.
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ancies in average student test scores across the Länder : fi; denotes a binary variable
that equals zero until the respective popularity poll observation which corresponds to the
nearest neighbor month of, or in other words the closest following event to, each PISA-E
announcement and equals one until the announcement of the next PISA-E results pub-
lication or state election. Variables ai denote the average students test scores in each
PISA-E test.11 Again, model-consistent estimates of coe¢cients bi require a positive
sign. In analogy to the event study analysis at the national level, we use specication (9)
to assess whether relative performances in PISA-E 2000 had a particularly stigmatizing
e¤ect on the incumbent governments of Länder at the time. In specication (10), we
do so for PISA-E 2000 and 2003, while in specication (11) the stigmatizing e¤ect of
relative performance is assumed to be spread across all three considered PISA-E tests.
Results are summarized on a state-by-state basis in the Appendix (Table A.2). In nearly
two third of cases, i.e., in 10 out of the 16 states, we nd indications of announcements
e¤ects by relying on specication (9) that are statistically signicant at conventional
levels. For specication (10) and (11), corresponding signicant e¤ects are found in one
fourth and about one third of states, respectively. We can interpret b1;i as a short-run
multiplier, that is, multiplied with the relative performances (Xi; = ai;2000 
n
2000 for
PISA-E 2000) it gives the individual e¤ect on the respective VP-function in the short










for b1;i (Table 4).
12 For b2;i and b3;i, we calculate them at the respective mean of
relative performances in the considered set of tests for states i with signicantly estimated
announcement e¤ects in specication (10) and (11), respectively (Table 5 and Table 6).
As Vi; is expressed in percent and we measure short-run as well as long-run e¤ects
11In PISA-E 2000 results were published both for 15 year-olds as well as for ninth graders.
We rely on the mean of the two scores in this case. Missing values for overall PISA-E 2000
scores for the city states of Hamburg and Berlin were approximated by the average score of
high school (Gymnasium) students test results that are available for the two states for this test
year.
12Due to small sample size, we abstracted from computing a long-run multiplier for the city
state of Bremen (HB).
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of relative performance by (dVi;=dXi; )Xi; and (@Vi;=@Xi; )Xi; for each state, both
measures are in percentage points. For example, (@Vi;=@Xi; )Xi; = +2:7 represents a
2.7 percentage point increase of the VP-function of the Bavarian incumbent government
implied by an incremental increase of relative performance of Bavarian students that
amounted to 24.5 percent of an international standard deviation (normed to 100) in
PISA-E 2000.
Table 4. Signicant short-run and long-run e¤ects of relative performance I
ai;2000 
n
2000 1;i b1;i (@V i;=@X i; )Xi; (dV i;=dX i; )Xi;
BY 24:5 0:49 0:11 +2:7 +5:3
BW 16:2 0:3 0:25 +4:1 +5:8
TH 3:4 0:08 0:96 +3:3 +3:5
RP  0:5 0:69 4:86  2:4  7:8
SH  1:2 0:41 2:21  2:7  4:5
NW  8:4 0:55 0:34  2:9  6:3
NI  9:0 0:34 0:89  8:0  12:1
ST  21:2 0:61 0:25  5:3  13:6
HB  34:0 1:15 0:06  2:0 
BE  8:0 0:61 0:51  4:1  10:5
Note: (@V i;=@X i; )Xi; ; (dV i;=dX i; )Xi; : %-points; underlying specication: (9)






) 2;i b2;i (@V i;=@X i; )Xi; (dV i;=dX i; )Xi;
BW 15:5 0:46 0:14 +2:2 +4:0
SH  1:0 0:32 2:92  2:9  4:3
HB  28:0 0:86 0:10  2:8 
BE  4:3 0:64 0:50  2:2  6:0
Note: (@V i;=@X i; )Xi; ; (dV i;=dX i; )Xi; : %-points; underlying specication: (10)
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) a3;i b3;i (@V i;=@X i; )Xi; (dV i;=dX i; )Xi;
BW 12:1 0:46 0:14 +1:7 +3:1
SH  3:2 0:32 1:24  4:0  5:8
NI  8:3 0:66 0:55  4:6  13:4
ST  8:8 0:74 0:14  1:2  4:7
BE  5:5 0:64 0:51  2:8  7:8
Note: (@V i;=@X i; )Xi; ; (dV i;=dX i; )Xi; : %-points; underlying specication: (11)
The corresponding long-run multiplier is +5.3 percentage points. Similar multipliers
are reported in Table 5 and Table 6 for b2;i and b3;i, respectively. For our interpretation
of the size of e¤ects, we have to keep in mind that they refer to an incumbent government
and, hence, not necessarily to a single party. As expected, PISA-E 2000 had the most
stigmatizing e¤ect on German education policy makers at the state-level, inasmuch as
combined relative performance and announcement e¤ects are found in nearly two third of
states, ranging between  5:3 (ST) and +4:1 (BW) percentage points. These statistically
signicant Salmon-Mechanism e¤ects shrink to sub-groups of state incumbent govern-
ments concerned by the announcement of PISA-E 2000, when we additionally consider
relative performances also for PISA-E 2003 (Table 5). The same applies to considering
all PISA-E test announcements (Table 6). However, both implied short-run and long-run
e¤ects are still sizable.
In sum, though facing suboptimal data at the level of federal states, our event study
exercises found substantial indications for the linchpin predictions of our model. Reelec-
tion probabilities of incumbent governments both at the national and state level, at least




This study was motivated by raising the question whether observed hybrid forms of
federal governance, i.e., forms that are neither strictly decentralized nor strictly central-
ized, in public education can be justied on theoretical and empirical grounds. Given the
linchpin predictions of a basic model of yardstick competition with incumbent-disciplining
e¤ects through voters comparing performance measures of public education both across
nations and federal states, the answer is no. Hybrid forms cannot be justied theo-
retically. This is due to an inherent strategic dilemma as the leading group of states
turns into a closed shop that is not interested in and possibly blocks Pareto-improving
education policies as soon as these imply a shrinking relative performance for states in
this group. Using event study analysis techniques, we found evidence for relative perfor-
mances in student achievement tests impacting on VP-functions of German national and
state government incumbents. Hence, in order to evade the trap of strategic dilemma,
decision-making authorities should be clear-cut and allocated exclusively either at the
level of federal states or at the level of the national government. From a political econ-
omy perspective, hybrid forms of federal governance in the context of public education
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1 Introduction
In Germany, the most popular campaign against intellectual property infringement is a
catchy one-minute trailer. It shows a mother of four in front of a prison arranging her
o¤spring like a chorus and shouting the happy birthday tune, staring in the direction of
some window behind the prisons fences. After nishing and turning around, one of the
kids sadly asks her mother when Daddy will be back. And she answers another four-
times singing. The trailer shown in theaters, on rental and commercially sold DVDs,
online, and on TV ends with a slogan from the o¤: Copyright infringement is a crime.
The trailer is produced by the federal alliance of audio-visual media (Bundesverband
Audiovisuelle Medien). It is targeted toward individuals engaged in all sorts of copyright
infringement. There are several other trailers produced and promoted in campaigns by
the audio-visual media industry. Most of them also show male individuals downloading
pirated media from the internet. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of a
single campaign, where a female individual is (herself) engaged in an act of digital piracy.1
Notably, this gender bias of anti-digital piracy campaigns contrasts, for example, with
the HIV prevention campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s, when several campaigns had
versions with swapped gender roles. This raises the question whether this policy can
be rationalized by empirical evidence, that is, whether it is justied and e¢cient to
exclusively focus on the deterrence of male individuals.
An issue that hitherto has received comparatively little attention from applied econo-
mists is the variation in digital piracy behavior between individuals  let alone European
individuals. Notable exceptions are Bounie et al. (2007), Chiang and Assane (2009),
1Digital piracy is the unauthorized use of copyrighted information goods. Varian (2000)
denes an information good as anything that can be digitized. Primarily, music, movies, and
software fall into this category. Digital products can be copied at almost no cost and are
subject to non-commercial copying by nal consumers. Because the copy of a copy typically
does not deteriorate in quality, copies can become available on a large scale basis as in le-
sharing networks (Peitz and Waelbroeck 2003, 2006). When a legal copyright exists, those who
want to access the copyrighted original work (that may or may not be digitized) must pay the
copyright holder an access price. If an individual obtains access without paying this price, that
person is said to have incurred an act of piracy (Andrés 2006).
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Holm (2003), Rob and Waldfogel (2006), and Zentner (2006). While the rst four of
these studies rely on student data, Zentner (2006) is based on a survey that is represen-
tative for the population of seven European countries. However, the study su¤ers from
not taking into account the actual quantity of media purchased and pirated by individ-
uals in the survey (Dejean 2009, p. 337). As our survey also oversamples students, the
study that is the closest to ours is the one by Bounie et al. (2007) using data from two
French graduate schools to analyze the interplay of music le sharing and consumption.
While their study is very illuminating and comprehensive in analyzing their results by
age, it is relatively silent on the gender issue. One possible reason is missing variation
as males are over-represented in their sample, making up 84.5% of total respondents. In
general, similar quantitative research on digital piracy that is based on micro-level data
is rare. Still the majority of studies in this vein are conducted and recognized outside
the economics literature (see, e.g., Al-Rafee and Cronan 2006, Moores and Chang 2006,
Hinduja 2007, and Goles et al. 2008).
The present study contributes to the literature in the following points. First, we
follow an integrated approach in considering the major occurrences of digital piracy in
the contemporary world: music, movies, software, and video games. We choose such an
integrated perspective as existing policies like the campaign described above  justied
or not  also treat these most popular forms of digital piracy as integrated. Second,
several studies claim that gender a¤ects digital piracy. In particular, it is either found
that male individuals are more likely to pirate (Sims et al. 1996, Hinduja 2003, Higgins
2006) or that gender explains a notable part of measured piracy behavior2 (see, among
others, Solomon and OBrien 1990, Holm 2003) or that male individuals show a lower
willingness to pay for legally acquired copyright goods (Chiang and Assane 2009). Here,
we follow a di¤erent strategy by discriminating between the frequency and the extent
of pirating and controlling for demographic factors, respectively. In contrast to existing
studies our sample does not only rely on undergraduate students as sole respondents but
is, at least in several regards, representative for the German population with high-speed
2Piracy behavior is measured, for example, as the share of illegal copies in a subjects col-
lection of music, computer games and software programs (Holm 2003, p. 3).
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internet access. Finally, recent piracy related crime statistics of the Federal O¢ce of
Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt) reinforce our ndings, suggesting that our
results are not driven by a gender-related self-reporting bias (Barber and Odean 2001,
Bengtsson et al. 2005). Although not based on direct evidence but rather on some
indicative reponses in our survey, a possible explanation for the found similarities and
di¤erences in download activities between males and females, i.e., a similar propensity to
pirate but at a di¤erent scale, can be male individuals acting more frequently as hubs
in (o­ine) social networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights some peculiarities
of digital piracy and the industry. In Section 3, we outline the construction and nature
of our dataset and the empirical approach followed. Findings of our study are presented
in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 Idiosyncrasies of Digital Piracy and the Industry
In the United States losses from copyright piracy of digital media are estimated to exceed
US$ 70 billion annually (Chiang and Assane 2009). Similar estimates can be found
for the European Union (EU). In a recent joint report by the European Commission
and the European Patent O¢ce the latest facts and gures on digital piracy in Europe
are reviewed (European Commission and European Patent O¢ce 2007). Against the
background of the notion that copies of digital media displace sales of legitimate versions
(competition e¤ect), inducing increased technological protection like new Digital Rights
Management protection and corresponding lobbyism and campaigns (Bounie et al. 2007,
p. 168), we discuss these gures and idiosyncrasies of the respective industry for the
most prominent branches: music, movies, and software.
Regarding the music industry, at the world level sales of illegal music recordings
account for 14 percent of the phonographic market. They have even outstripped the sales
of genuine products since 2003 in the UK. By 2008 just one in 20 internet downloads is
legal. Within the European Union pirated goods accounted for 10 percent of sales at the
beginning of the century. The Commission estimates that in the music sector implied VAT
losses incurred by EU governments amount to US$100 million per year. The total number
of employees in the German recording industry steadily decreased from 112,000 in 2001
to 87,000 in 2007.3 Of course, this is not to say that there are not other central factors 
above all the technical revolution in digital recording  that led to this development. A
peculiarity of the music market is that there might not only be a competition e¤ect as
argued above, but also a sampling e¤ect. The latter refers to digital copies inducing
consumers to discover, e.g., new genres, the style and quality of new releases, groups,
and artists and ultimately to buy corresponding and related products like CD albums or
concert tickets through legal channels that outweigh the losses through piracy.4 Bounie
et al. (2007) nd that particularly the o­ine sharing of mp3 les holds such a potential.
3Figures reported by the German council of music funds; http://www.musikindustrie.de.
4See Curien and Moreau (2009) for a recent theoretical rationalization of this argument.
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The situation is markedly di¤erent for the motion picture industry. First, the share
of pirated goods exceeds the one of the music market by about 6 percent in the Common
Market (European Commission and European Patent O¢ce 2007), that is, it is even
more subject to digital piracy. Lobbies like the Motion Picture Association of America
estimate that US studios lose more than US$ 3 billion annually in box o¢ce revenue
from piracy in an industry that relies on foreign markets for the bulk of its sales (De
Vany and Walls 2007). Second, in contrast to the music industry, the theatrical market
is the primary market of the motion picture industry, while the market for disks is only
secondary in the sense that the latter would not exist without the former, narrowing
the room for potential sampling e¤ects.5 In this context De Vany and Walls (2007, p.
292) note that a small revenue leakage from piracy can be magnied when the movie
is released sequentially, rst to cinemas and then to other windows of distribution.
One indication that such herding e¤ects outweigh exploring e¤ects is the recent practice
of synchronizing international releases in order to prevent copies from early releases to
undermine revenues from later venues. Finally and most importantly, there is, in contrast
to the music industry, a profound feedback loop from the demand side back to supply.
As a decisive second round e¤ect the demand and assessment of early consumers through
rankings, blogs, etc. essentially determine the theatrical supply in later venues. A failure
to meet the holdover amount required to extend the run for another week can ultimately
disrupt the spread and success of the release. Information bias through poor pirated
copies and word-of-mouth transmission is the central channel that leads to such a collapse
of theatrical grosses. In their recent case study, De Vany andWalls (2007) nd substantial
evidence for this kind of adverse herding e¤ects through digital piracy.
With regard to software piracy, gures of the industrys annual losses in Western
Europe (that is, in the EU, Norway, and Switzerland) exceed US$ 3 billion (European
5Note that there are only a few niche genres (B-movies, the pornographic market, etc.),
where movies directly appear as stream version or on disk. The blockbuster industry, including
productions like Alice in Wonderland or Avatar with costs in the dimension of  US$
200 million, usually refrains from video on demand (VOD) versions before four months passed
after release. And even if there were earlier legal VOD versions, set top boxes technologies
or, in general, the poor net connectivity of TV sets do not (yet) measure up to the theatrical
experience of these movies.
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Commission and European Patent O¢ce 2007). Given the lack of empirical studies in
this area and idiosyncrasies of the market for business software on the one hand and
entertainment software (in particular, computer and video console games) on the other,
it is unclear whether sampling e¤ects or adverse herding e¤ects dominate this industry.
We should also be clear about the fact that ascertaining whether or not digital piracy
implies net social costs and welfare losses (cf. Dejean 2009) is beyond the scope of
the present study. Finally, it is noteworthy that, besides the aforementioned empirical
studies, there is also some recent progress with regard to theoretical explanations of the
phenomenon6 and in cross-country studies.7
6See Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) for a critical review.
7See Holm (2003), Banerjee et al. (2005), Van Kranenburg and Hogenbirk (2005), and Andrés
(2006). A comprehensive survey of empirical studies dedicated to assess the consequences of
digital piracy on the revenue of the cultural industry is Dejean (2009).
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3 Data and Empirical Approach
Our sample is stratied so as to match the gender composition of German employees. The
corresponding ve years average female employee share is supportive for the 40 percent
used in our query.8 With regard to the age composition of our sample, we replicate the age
structure of the German population using a broadband9 technology to access the internet.
As reported in TNS Infratest (2007), at the time of our survey the use of xed and/or
other broadband technologies was the most prominent for individuals in their twenties.
Besides this core of users, the second largest group is made of the rst half of thirty-
somethings and teenagers. For individuals of age beyond 39 the share of broadband
users signicantly falls. Our survey is representative of this type of age structure of
German high-speed onliners. Detailed summary statistics on the age structure of our
sample is given in the rst columns of Table 2. Our share of foreign respondents and
respondents with a migration background living in Germany maps the share of about one
fth of the German population as reported in o¢cial statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt
2007, p. 37).
We conducted our survey during the seven months from April to October 2006. The
participants were recruited online and o­ine.10 More than 1,500 e-mails containing a
URL directing to our surveys webpage were sent. The questionnaire took 5-10 minutes
to get lled out. The online platform was designed so as to let participants choose between
a questionnaire in German or English. Questions were asked open-ended as well as in
the form of questions with a given set of alternative answers. See Appendix B for detail.
Since some questions concerned illegal activities, anonymity was assured already as of
8Annual reports and statistics on the structure of the German working population are avail-
able online from the Federal Employment O¢ce (http://www.pub.arbeitsamt.de):
9In particular, implying the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) standard.
10Apart from the surveys URL no further information on the query was communicated in
the recruitment process (neither online nor o­ine). We got the e-mail addresses from private
social networks, the Munich Intellectual Property Law Center, and from the student council of
business and economics students at Munich University of Technology, comprising students, but
also alumni students, friends and sponsors of the faculty. If e-mail addresses expired or were
no longer accessible, we sent hardcopy yers to promote our online survey, if postal addresses
were available (i.e. in 53 cases).
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the beginning of the query. As soon as our sample was stratied to match the structure
outlined above, that is, as soon as we had enough answers to meet a female share of 40
percent, a share of respondents with foreigner status or migration background living in
Germany of 20 percent, and an age structure matching the ordinality of age groups in
terms of size as sketched above, we ended the survey. This was the case in October 2006
when 222 subjects had participated. The implied response rate was about 15 percent.
One may be concerned that the survey sample is plagued by a serious self-selection bias
as one may suspect the sketched recruitment process to draw participants who tend to be
involved in digital piracy activities and, therefore, are interested in the survey. We tried
to assess this bias by an implicit control experiment. Both the (o­ine) distributed yers
and the sent e-mails only contained the following information: the URL of the surveys
webpage and a note that it would be greatly appreciated if the readers were to participate
in a research project  without any further denition of the project. As we o¤ered
no participation fees, the incentive to participate essentially consisted of the warm
glow derived from contributing to an academic research project. Our survey web tool
(http://www.befrager.de) allowed us to quantify the termination rate of participants
after they were informed about what the survey is actually about (that is, after the rst
survey page containing the language choice). Only 21 out of a total of 243 persons directed
to our surveys page (i.e., 8.6%) terminated the lling of the questionnaire after the choice
of language. This outcome makes us condent to not rely on a sample plagued by severe
selection bias. However, the reader should be aware of the caveat that there certainly
remains some potential for selection bias in the conduct of our survey, in particular, as
it is concerned with confessing illegal activities.
The retrievable information from our query can be summarized in three broad cat-
egories: information on the extent and frequency of pirating digital media (dependent
variables), on demographic characteristics (binary variables), and on attitude (categor-
ical variables). A detailed overview is given in Appendix A. As our starting point, we
consider the following two specications:






hAh;i + "i (3.1)
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hAh;i + "i; (3.2)
where FREQi and XSAV E

i are i-th individuals latent variables referring to the self-
assessed pirating frequency11 and the annual amount of money saved by pirating, re-
spectively. Dj;i is a set of ND = 8 individual demographic characteristics. Ah;i denotes
NA = 4 subject specic variables reecting motives and attitude toward digital piracy.
Finally, "i are standard i.i.d. error terms.
As our dependent variable represents the outcome of a typical categorical rating
neither a multinomial nonlinear probability model for unsorted data nor OLS measure
up to the nature of these data. This is due to the fact that both methods cannot cope
with the ordinality of the data. For example, LS estimates always treat intervals between
categories identically. However, they may vary in length for our surveys respondents.


















1 for FREQ = 0 = 1
2 for 1 < FREQ
  2
3 for 2 < FREQ
  3
4 for FREQ > 3
(3.3)
with FREQi representing the latent given in (3.1). The K = 3 thresholds are denoted
by k for k = 1; :::; K: For a better interpretation of results obtained from the ordered
Probit specication, we calculate marginal e¤ects for the bottom category (MELji) and
top category (MEUji), respectively:
MELji =
 Pr [FREQi = 1]
xji
= [ ( 0xji)] 
0; and
MEUji =
 Pr [FREQi = 4]
xji
= [ (3   
0xji)] 
0;
where  () denotes the standard normal probability density function.
11The assessment ranges from 1 = never to 4 = often; see Appendix A and Appendix B for
further detail.
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Similarly, as the distribution of XSAV E is clearly left censored at a zero value, we
consider a standard censored (Tobit) regression model to estimate a regression model
with latent (3.2).12
12For comparison reasons the estimations of frequency and extent of digital piracy using OLS can be
found in Table 8 und 9 at the end of the appendix.
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4 Findings
As can be seen from Figure 1, German internet users place the highest weight on music
when it comes to assess the relative importance of di¤erent categories of pirated digital
media in their collections.































































































































business software entertainment software music movies
Note: Weighted by quantity and amount of money saved.
In line with the European trend only 10 percent of respondents do not own illegally
acquired music les. The second most relevant portfolio share (in terms of quality and
saved cost) is made up of movies followed closely by business software. Nearly one half of
German internet users do not own pirated entertainment software like video games. Less
than 10 percent put a high weight on this type of digital products in their collections.
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In order to avoid issues of collinearity and to assess the particular relevance of the
student status in pirating digital media,13 we estimate two sets of specications of
models with latents (3.1) and (3.2), respectively: Specications i to vii control for the age
structure of the German population with broadband internet access using three distinct
age dummies, while specications viii to xiv rely on a student dummy only.14
We start our interpretation of results with models explaining the individual frequency
of pirating digital media FREQi (Table 3, 4 and 6). This dependent variable represents
a general and ordinal self-assessment ranging from 1 = never to 4 = often. Overall the
specications explain up to one fth to one fourth of the variation in FREQi.
Obviously, the individual age matters. Other things equal, the age group representing
the youngest subjects (< 21 years old) is associated with a higher frequency of pirating
digital media. This xed age e¤ect is estimated signicantly throughout and decreases
with age. In contrast, the student dummy is estimated to have no statistically signicant
e¤ect, though in specications, where we do not control for the self-assessed weight of the
reason for pirating being the budget constraint, we obtain p-values only slightly above
10 percent. It is, therefore, straightforward to presume that in specications x to xii
STUD instruments issues of a¤ordability. A nding in stark contrast to the literature
that claims that male subjects are more likely to pirate (Sims et al. 1996, Hinduja
2003, Higgins 2006) is the following: As can be seen from Table 3, 4 and 6, gender is
found to have no e¤ect on the individual frequency of digital piracy that is statistically
di¤erent from zero. In terms of size, apart from the above mentioned age dummies,
the negative impact of being of German nationality is the most profound. It is followed
by a highly signicant positive e¤ect from having access to a DSL connection. We also
nd a sizable and highly signicant negative impact from the perceived probability to get
prosecuted for pirating and the perceived degree of complexity implied by pirating digital
13Holm (2003), for example, emphasizes the timely computer skills of students and their
relatively large size of network of friends with skills and interest in computers and access to
digital media copies.
14It seems to matter only in the case, where the extent of digital piracy is used as dependent
(Table 5). However, keep in mind that this might be the product of missing variation as we
oversampled students in our survey.
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products.15 Both e¤ects are of similar size and comparable to the e¤ect from having
access to a DSL connection. The budget constraint impact is estimated signicantly
negative and of slightly lower size. The possible e¤ect of the household income is positive
but estimated statistically insignicant in all regressions. Unfortunately, we do not have
further information concerning the social background of respondents. All results hold true
for the ordered Probit (Table 3) as well as for the ordered Logit (Table 4) specications.
For the calculated marginal e¤ects for FREQi = 1 and FREQi = 4 of the ordered Probit
specications see Table 6.
Our regressions output for explaining the individual extent of digital piracyXSAV Ei
(Table 5) gives a somehow di¤erent picture. It justies our strategy of separating fre-
quency and extent. As can be seen from specications i to vii, the age group AGE2125,
representing respondents in their early twenties, stands out. It is this age group which
can be seen as predominantly responsible for the overall extent of digital piracy  both
in terms of statistical signicance and size. Although we estimate signicant coe¢cients,
cost saving motives (BUDGET ) play but a minor role in the explanation of the indi-
vidual extent of digital piracy. The same applies for a high perceived probability to
get prosecuted for pirating (PPROS). The positive impact from a DSL connection has
neither a robust (it is merely signicant in our censored regressions) nor a particularly
strong e¤ect. The impact of the household income is negative but again insignicant in
all regressions.
Our most remarkable nding, however, is that male individuals given that they
pirate at all do it at a signicantly larger scale.16 This result is also in line with most
15The perceived probability to get prosecuted for pirating (PPROS), the perceived degree of
complexity implied by pirating digital products (COMPLX), the self-assessed weight of the
reason for pirating being the budget constraint (BUDGET ), the self-assessed weight of the
reason for pirating being to try out the product (TRIAL), and the high household income
variable (INCOME) are all collapsed into a respective binary dummy that represents an above-
average agreement to the respective statement (level 4 or higher; range runs from 1 to 5; see
Appendix A for details) for value = 1. Results are robust for other (categorial) denitions of
the respective dummy.
16Throughout our estimation results reported in Table 5 and 6, MALE clearly shows the
largest and most signicant coe¢cient estimates (apart from the AGE2125 dummy). Note,
estimates are robust to the exclusion of outliers. Respective results are available on request
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of the ndings of the existing literature that attribute a notable part of measured piracy
behavior to gender di¤erences (Sims et al. 1996, Hinduja 2003, Higgins 2006, Solomon
and OBrien 1990, Holm 2003, Rob and Waldfogel 2006). The explanations of these
gender di¤erences are diverse. However, they are all rooted in the argument that females
have higher ethical standards than males.17 We do not subscribe to this view: Given
that higher ethical standards are at the heart of the gender di¤erences we would expect a
di¤erence both in the extent as well as in the frequency of pirating. But given that we nd
a profound gender di¤erence for the extent and no gender di¤erence for the frequency of
pirating, how can this be reconciled with the existing evidence to make a common sense?
The answer is to be found in the combination of the recent development of the digital
economy and the role played by male individuals. We will discuss both successively.
As Peitz and Waelbroeck (2003) note digital products involve interactions. For music
and video les about which people like to talk they particularly imply social interaction.
In times of hard-drive parties turning from a widely unrecognized phenomenon into a
fad, it is above all social interactions that come to the fore. The following statement by
British music producer Cli¤ Jones makes the point:
The latest cultural import from America is the hard-drive party. It involves takeaway
pizza, beer and the swapping of the contents of 500Gb hard drives, packed full of thousands
of music tracks. My own neighbour, resolutely middle-class, with two young children at a
church school, proudly told me last weekend that he has 80,000 classic tracks on a drive
he got free from a friend. At a rough guess, thats £60,000 of stolen music.
The Sunday Times, August 10, 2008
The di¤erentiation by Peitz and Walbroeck (2003, p. 1) according to which digital
piracy is done in two ways, either by downloading from the internet or by using networks
of friends sharing digital products on a small-scale basis seems no longer valid. A
from the authors.
17Chiang and Assane (2009) consider both gender and ethics variables in their innovative
study on the willingness to pay of students for legal digital music purchases in the presence of
illegal versions. In their Heckit model estimates they nd the marginal e¤ect (M.E.) of being
of male sex in the decision to be willing to pay to be clearly outnumbered by the corresponding
M.E. on the amount (see their Table 2). As the estimates do not include interaction terms, the
authors do not ascribe the gender di¤erence to higher ethical standards of female students.
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terabyte, that is, approximately 200,000 digitized recordings, is a standard unit of ex-
change at hard-drive parties. In these dimensions and in such social gatherings, it is no
longer the social prestige of the legal owner that is increased (Peitz and Waelbroeck 2003,
p. 10) but the social prestige of the rst owner  whether legal or illegal owner. Our
survey is obviously designed to address the issue of end-user piracy rather than piracy
for protable resale (e.g., Banerjee 2003). However, by explicitly considering friends as
a channel of getting hold of illegally acquired media, we also take into account o­ine
forms of le swapping in social networks. To the best of our knowledge our study is the
rst to consider this Zeitgeist phenomenon.
According to our survey, in Germany the most frequently used channels of distribution
and hubs of pirated digital media are friends; see Figure 2.







Internet Friends Markets Other
not the case
the case
Given that male individuals act more frequently as such hubs in social networks,
we can explain both of our ndings (i.e., a profound gender di¤erence for the extent
and no di¤erence for the frequency of pirating). Indeed information drawn from our
survey points into this direction (Table 7). While male individuals on average get hold
of illegally acquired digital media more frequently through the internet, females do so
more frequently through their circle of friends. These di¤erences can easily be found to
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be signicant at a 5 percent level of signicance in corresponding mean di¤erence tests.
Finally, one may be concerned that the reported results are plagued by a self-reporting
bias inasmuch as males frequently overestimate their self-reported performance (see,
among others, Barber and Odean 2001, Bengtsson et al. 2005). However, in contrast to
this explanation of males showing a higher piracy extent, our hypothesis ascribing di¤er-
ences to social networking activities is consistent with recent crime statistics. Suppose
that our gender di¤erences found in the piracy extent (not frequency) are primarily due
to males over-reporting their digital piracy behavior, then we would expect no gender
di¤erences in the statistics of criminal complaints, that is, in the actual (not reported)
piracy extent. The German Federal O¢ce of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt)
reports that charges led against pirating individuals in the case of copyright infringe-
ment, including online and o­ine le swapping, and private software piracy18 showed
an average damaging sum of 2,300 Euros and 676 Euros per charge, respectively (own
calculation based on gures reported in PKS 2008, 2009). The median damage sum falls
in both cases in the category of 250500 Euros amount of loss. These are sizable gures,
showing that trie amounts are not criminally prosecuted in Germany. In the case of
copyright infringement about four fth of complaints of o¤ense were made against male
individuals (77.6 percent). For private software piracy even more than four fth, that is,
80.5 percent, of charged individuals were male. These gures clearly speak against the
explanation of males notoriously overestimating their self-reported piracy behavior.
18Statistical codes are 71500 Straftaten im Zusammenhang mit Urheberrechtsbestimmungen
(UrheberrechtsG, MarkenG, § 17 UWG, GebrauchsmusterG, GeschmacksmusterG, Kunsturhe-
berrechtsG, PatentG, HalbleiterschutzG) and 71510  Softwarepiraterie (private Anwendung
z.B. Computerspiele), respectively (PKS 2008, 2009).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we empirically investigated determinants of digital piracy. To this end we
conducted a survey comprising the behavior and attitudes of some 200 German indi-
viduals, approximately matching the gender composition of German employees and the
age structure of the population with broadband internet access in 2006. Although our
study  like any study based on stated responses on a condential basis  is subject to
problems of selectivity that are virtually impossible to be fully overcome, and although
it does not address issues of causality, our estimates o¤er new insights on gender dif-
ferences and similarities in the context of digital piracy. As we identied a gender gap
for the extent but not the frequency of pirating, our ndings do not justify the current
practice of campaign policies exclusively aimed at deterring male individuals. Against
the recent nding of o­ine mp3 le sharing showing positive net e¤ects on music CD
consumption through sampling e¤ects, the current practice of integrating the major oc-
currences of digital piracy in campaigns is questionable. Combining these insights with
our ndings suggests to refrain from deterring le swapping in the case of digital music
and to consider campaigns addressing male as well as female individuals (for example, in
trailers with swapped gender roles) for industries that are susceptible to demand shocks
in early launching phases of products like the motion picture and software industries.
Furthermore, we found male subjects to be more inclined to swap pirated media online
rather than through physical contacts. The opposite applied to females. One possible
explanation for this nding is that males act as hubs and female subjects as beneciaries
from indirect appropriation in the growing o­ine spread of pirated media. As this nding
is reinforced by recent crime statistics, gender related self-reporting bias seemed not to
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The contribution of part 2 is twofold, focusing on both preferred college class size and
monetary value for smaller classes. First, we examine the impact of class size on student
evaluations of instructor performance using a sample of approximately 1,400 economics
classes held at the University of Munich between fall 1998 and summer 2007. Controlling
for both instructor and course xed e¤ects, we o¤er conrmatory evidence for the recent
nding of a large, highly signicant, and nonlinear negative impact of class size on stu-
dent evaluations of instructor e¤ectiveness that is robust to the inclusion of course and
instructor xed e¤ects. Beyond that, we run a survey based on the contingent valuation
method and a representative sample of all Munich students of management science to
quantify the welfare surplus of an agreeable class size. We nd the average monetary
value of the surplus to lie between 5 and 300 Euros per semester and student. Over-
all, Hicksian and Marshallian surpluses can reach substantial values of 0.5 to 0.8 million
Euros per semester. From an administrators perspective, our ndings imply that both
instructor e¢ciency as measured by instructional evaluations and welfare measures are
(highly) elastic in classes with less than approximately 100-125 students, while beyond
this threshold the valuation of the status quo becomes insensitive to increases in class
size. In practice, it is usually this dimension where the instructors use of a microphone
becomes inevitable. Similarly, we nd a threshold e¤ect at a maximum class size of 19
which can be valuable information for aiding policy in practice if, for example, depart-
ments have to set participation limits on seminars. This result conrms our intuition with
regard to applicable pedagogy as for class formats  20 students an instructor hardly
knows her students names by heart and the course loses its hands-on character.
Analyzing the determinants of welfare surpluses drawn from small class sizes using stated
preferences data from the same survey as in part 2, we nd in part 3 male students
systematically to show a higher preference for small class sizes. These ndings are in line
with enrollement behavior at private business schools in Germany as well as age-earnings
proles. Additionally, we nd that besides a general preference for higher education
cost awareness of students, captured by their need to work or externally nance their
studies has a signicant positive impact on their preference for small classes. Given the
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recent ndings of small college class sizes fostering teaching e¢ciency and against the
background of notoriously steeper experience-income proles of male university graduates
in Germany, this result can be rationalized by standard human capital theory arguments.
In part 4 we overcome econometric misspecication and failure to account for major
determinants of student achievement, which represents the central problem in correctly
identifying the school input  student achievement relationship (Todd and Wolpin 2003).
By relying on a portfolio of extreme bounds analysis techniques as well as a newly com-
piled cross-state dataset on cumulative instructional time from rst to ninth (i.e., OECD
PISA-test date) grade for German states, we addressed two fundamental shortcomings
in the literature: A serious error-in-variables problem due to using poor proxies of in-
structional time and the widely ignored issue of model uncertainty. Using pooled data on
instructional time and student performance by subject, our study nds evidence for the
school input  student achievement relationship for German states. This nding is robust
both to the inclusion of state xed e¤ects and in an extensive extreme bounds analysis.
It stands in contrast to the majority of related studies. Highschool ninth graders from
the OECD Programme of International Student Assessment (PISA-E) tests bottom per-
centiles benet most from extra-instructional time measured in cumulated form from rst
up to ninth grade. Besides total instructional time exposure, we identify eight further so-
cial environment and institutional variables with robust impact on student performance.
In contrast to instructional time hardly any of these factors can be a¤ected by policy in
the short run.
Considering growing national and international accountability movement in education
outcomes, part 5 addresses the fundamental question of whether observed hybrid forms
of federal governance can be justied on theoretical and empirical grounds in a federally
organized democracy with a two-tiered government. Given the linchpin predictions of a
basic model of yardstick competition with incumbent-disciplining e¤ects through voters
comparing performance measures of public education both across nations and federal
states, the answer is no. Hybrid forms cannot be justied theoretically. This is due to
an inherent strategic dilemma as the leading group of states turns into a closed shop
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that is not interested in and possibly even blocks Pareto-improving education policies
as soon as these imply a shrinking relative performance for states in this group. Using
event study analysis techniques, we found evidence for relative performances in student
achievement tests impacting on VP-functions of German national and state government
incumbents. Hence, in order to evade the trap of strategic dilemma, decision-making
authorities should be clear-cut and allocated exclusively either at the level of federal
states or at the level of the national government. From a political economy perspective,
hybrid forms of federal governance in the context of public education are to be avoided.
Finally Part 6 empirically investigates determinants of digital piracy in Germany for
several types of digitized products to identify factors that favor intelectual property rights
infringement and hence could harm human capital. To this end we rely on a survey
comprising behavior and attitudes at the individual level. The sample matches some
demographic characteristics of the German population with high-speed internet access
with regard to gender and age composition. It also maps the share of foreign nationals in
Germany. Self-selection in the drawing of our sample is assessed by a control experiment.
In contrast to existing studies, we sharply discriminate between frequency and extent of
pirating digital media. We nd no signicant gender di¤erence in the propensity to pirate.
However, male individuals are prone to pirate at a signicantly larger scale. We attribute
this nding to male individuals acting more frequently as hubs and female subjects as
beneciaries from indirect appropriation in the growing o­ine spread of pirated media. It
is particularly important in light of the recent shift from peer-to-peer online networks to
o­ine forms of le swapping. As our ndings are conrmed by recent piracy related crime
statistics of the Federal O¢ce of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt), gender
related self-reporting bias seemed not to be an issue in our study. Hence we identied a
gender gap for the extent but not the frequency of pirating, our ndings do not justify
the current practice of campaign policies exclusively aimed at deterring male individuals.
Against the recent nding of o­ine mp3 le sharing showing positive net e¤ects on music
CD consumption through sampling e¤ects, the current practice of integrating the major
occurrences of digital piracy in campaigns is questionable. Combining these insights with
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our ndings suggests to refrain from deterring le swapping in the case of digital music
and to consider campaigns addressing male as well as female individuals (for example, in
trailers with swapped gender roles) for industries that are susceptible to demand shocks
in early launching phases of products like the motion picture and software industries.
Furthermore, we found male subjects to be more inclined to swap pirated media online
rather than through physical contact. The opposite applied to females. One possible
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